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Purpose of the Report
The primary purpose of this report is to identify,
describe, and analyze those reform measures which have been
introduced in the 91st Congress and which relate to the
congressional phase of the Federal budget process. Budgetary
reform proposals arte evaluated, to the extent possible,
from the congressional point of vlev; c Using this approach,
the report estimates the feasibility of acceptance and
enactment of particular proposed changes.
To provide a fou.nda.tion for the evaluation of
current reform legislation, subsidiary portions of this
report record a brief history of the congressional phase of
the budgetary process, describe current budgetary methods and
procedures, identify specific criticisms leveled at Congress,
analyze past efforts at reform and discuss major events and
legislative actions which have influenced and modified the
budget process.
Reform Proposal s for the Budget
A large number of serious criticisms are being

2directed at the organization and procedures of Congress.
An abundant literature is available listing all manner of
reform proposals. Changes are being demanded in the seniority
system, committee structure and procedure, administrative
organization, leadership hierarchy, and the many, nonrelevant
duties and responsibilities assigned to congressmen.
While acknowledging the validity and seriousness
of many criticisms, practical constraints preclude a complete
analysis and evaliiation of all reforms currently being
proposed. Accordingly, a smaller and more manageable
segment of congressional activity has been isolated for
research purposes. Analysis, comments and evaluation in
this report are restricted to those. reform proposals relating
to the congressional phase of the budgetary process.
The preparation, authorization and appropriation
processes associated with the Federal budget are extremely
complex. The budget is a statement of the goals and
objectives of the government and it establishes priorities
for accomplishment of specific activities and programs.
The budget is, simultaneously, a political document, a
statement of economic and fiscal policy, a financial manage-
ment document and a blueprint for forthcoming Federal
activities and operations.
The authorization and appropriations phase of the
budgetary process has become the subject of increasing

3criticism in the news media and literature in recent years.
Legislation is pending before the 91st Congress which, if
enacted , will bring about a number of changes.
Methods of Evaluating Reform Proposal s
Having selected the budgetary process for research
and study, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 19?0 has been utilized as a research vehicle.
Due to its pre-eminence, in the appropriations process, the
House Appropriations Committee is singled out for special
analysis and comment throughout the reports
A substantial amount of the criticism leveled at
Congress and the budgetary process has come from individuals
who are not members of the legislature and, thus, have an
"outsider's view and bias," Writers from the fields of
political science, social science and management science,
among others, have alleged that Congress is ineffective,
archaic and poses a barrier to progress. These critics
maintain that Congress urgently needs reform and suggest
a multitude of changes and improvements, A number are
referenced in this report e
In addition to the "outside critics," an increasing
number of articles and books, authored by members of Congress,
have begun to appear on the subject of congressional reform.
The thesis of this report is that the most promising

kproposals for reform, have originated from and must,
inevitably, be accepted by this group.
To acquire some insight into reform legislate
introduced in the current Congress, and to obtain an informed
measure of the degree of congressional support for the
various proposals, personal interviews were held with
selected officials and staff personnel involved in the
appropriations process.
Various offices on Capitol Hill and committee;
staff members made available copies of printed hearings,
committee reports, legislative documents, committee prints,
and provided candid commentaries on committee activities
relating to proposed reform legislation
.
The Congressional Record and the £ongile£SA£i2f;i
Digest were extensively reviewed. Whenever possible,
selected floor debates and committee hearings were attended
to develop a greater appreciation and understanding of the
bud ge tary process.
Prelude to Budgetary Reform
In his January, 1970, State of the Union message,
President Nixon stated, "it is a time for institutional
review and reform." The President stressed that governmental
institutional reforms were needed now and referred to the

19?0,9 s as "an age of reform. "*
In addition to the corrective measures required
for solving such major problems a : pollution, j by, and
crime, is it possible that the President and his congressional
audience also envision the beginning of an "age of reform"
on Capitol Hill?
There have been indications that the Congress,
and expecially the Senate , recognizes deficiencies in its
present operations and internal structure „ One such
indica.tion was the establishment of the Joint Committee
on the Organization of tne Congress v The Joint Committee
was assigned the following tasks by the 89th Congress s
. « • to make a full and complete study of the
organization and operation of the Congress of the
United States and to recommend improvements in
such organization and operation with a view toward
strengthening the Congress, simplifying its
operations, improving its relationships with
other branches of the United States government,
and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities
under the Constitution,, ?-
The establishment of this Committee marked the
first major congressional effort at reform since 19^-6, when
public and congressional demands for reform finally resulted
1
"State of the Union Address," NBC Telecast,
January 22, 19?0.
2u e S e Congress, Senates Organizat ion of Cj 'csji
,
S. Rept. kZ6 Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,
1965, P. 2.

in the establishment of a similar Joint Committee with
similar responsibilities, goals and objectives. The work
of the earlier Joint Committee resulted in the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19^-6 8 This Act and its reform
provisions are discussed later in this report, It is
sufficient to note, at this point, that the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19^6 was the first major reform since
the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
creating the national budget system,
The Joint Committee (89th Congress) rendered its
report on July 28, 1966, Reform legislation based on the
report was first introduced in 1967, and has been introduced
in each Congress since that time 6
The 19?0*s may be "an age of reform," Certainly
the Congress is acutely aware of the continuing erosion of
its power and influence relative to that of the President
and the Executive Branch, A privately financed management
consultant's study recently reported j
The Presidency continues to be developed and perfected
as an instrument for decision, and indeed, the Executive
Branch has repeatedly been the subject of constructive
analysis, including the Hoover Commission studies and
examinations by experienced administrators and academi-
cians who have applied new knowledge and techniques to
Federal government administration. The Executive Office
of the President has reached a level of excellence as a
modern institution facilitating E ;ecutive decision. By
contrast , Congress has greatly lagged behind the




Recognition of its deficiencies, and the need for
reform by some members of Congress , or even by a majority
of the members, may not be sufficient to actually legislate
change. Many reform proposals have been introduced in
Congress since the enactment of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 19^-6, but such efforts towards congressional reform
have been consistently unsuccessful
Former Senator Joseph S„ Clark of Pennsylvania,
a strong and outspoken advocate for congressional reform,
has stressed that "reform is now more urgent than ever
before " The Senator has written:
In this jumble of party organization, some parts of
the machinery work effectively and democratically,
others do not work at all. The result, however, is
control of the inner workings of the Congress ion::.!
institution by a conservative bipartisan minority
coalition I have named the Congressional Establish-
ment - the tight little band of men who, dedicated
to the status quo, and determined to maintain their
power and prerogative, guard the citadel against the
majority will and prevent Congressional reform ,^
Senator Clark cites a need for a complete re-
examination of the rules, procedures, customs and traditions
of the Congress in order to update and modernize the
3Dr« Philip Donham and Robert Fahey, Congress
Needs Help
,
(New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 1^7-1^9.
^Joseph So Clark, "Coda: Making Congress Work,"
Reprinted in Co '" i(5I1ir2_R®ror™J„ Problems -and Prospects
,
(New York: Thomas ~Y." Crowe 11 CoV, 1965), p. 3^6.

8gov..:: . ' -1 machinery.
As the Congress, and the country, enter a new
decade in the ?C°s* perhaps the growing pi ?es for
change will prevail , The political climate and public
opinion seem to he conducive for the enactment of a modern
Reorganization Act* The news media continues to carry
criticisms leveled at the "archaic customs and hallowed
traditions" of the Congress.
In order to establish a foundation for under-
standing and appreciating the many facets involved in
effecting congressional reform, the following Chapter
provides a synopsis of historical developments in the
Federal budgetary process. Thereafter, and prior to
consideration of specific criticisms and current legislative
reform proposals, a survey of major reform legislation and
applicable commission reports is discussed.

CHAPTER II
THE CONGRESSIONAL PHASE OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
Constitutional Authority
The Congress derives its authority to legislate,
to raise revenues
s and to expend public monies directly
from the Constitution of the United States,, Applicable
sections of the Constitution serve to establish the
"authority" of Congress for enacting legislation, passing
revenue and appropriation measures, and exercising
appropriate control and oversight over the programs and
activities of the Executive Branch
,
Art If SeCe 1
All legislative powers he-rein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives
.
Arte I, Sec. 8
Para* 18 The Congress shall have the power to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all the other powers vested by this Constitution
in the government of the United States , or in any
department or officer thereof;
Para. 12 ... to raise and support Armies;
Para. 13 ... to provide and maintain a Navy;
Para. 1^ ... to make rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval forces,
Art. 1, Sec. 9
Para. 7 No money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by law;
and a regular statement and account of the receipts
and expenditures of all public money shall be
published from time to time.
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The President of the United States is Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but his powers and authority
are subject to limitation and review by the Congress, The
Constitution assigns to Congress the exclusive power to
raise armies and provide and maintain a Navy. The Congress
is further assigned power to regulate and administer the
armed services The President, as the chief executive,
has exclusive power to exercise military command over the
armed services in peace and in war, and the President
exercises and administers the statutory rules and regulations,
relating to the services B Thus, the Congress and the
President jointly share responsibility for the armed
services , The Congress provides and administers: the
President exercises command and control. This dichotomy
is somewhat similar to the administrative management/
military command relationships in the Department of the
Navy In the Naval establishment, an activity looks to its
administrative commander for logistics support and technical
direction, and to its military commander for operational
control and mission assignments.
The blurring of Executive/Legislative Branch
responsibility and authority was obviously intentional,
on the part of the authors of the Constitution,, The
separation of powers, in this manner, though recognized to
be somewhat inefficient, was intended as added protection
against tyranny by a despotic government. The fear of
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tyranny was still fresh in the minds of our early leaders.
As a result „ the Constitution establish a Federal govern-
ment with limited powers to ensure that ultimate power
remained in the hands of the individual citizen. In
Congressional Control of Administration, Joseph Harris
describes the separation of powers:
The writers of the Constitution of the United States
established a separation of powers by providing for a
Congress and a President on the same legal plane, then
blurred the separation by giving each certain rights
to check or influence the activities of the other . «
. .
the Constitution vested the executive power in the
President but gave to Congress certain specific functions
including authority to provide for executive departments
and their officers, to advise and consent to (or reject)
the President's nomination to the principal offices, and
to provide the funds for the departments to spend .5
The Congress began to exercise its powers, as
granted by the Constitution, immediately. With the establish-
ment of executive departments, Congress made it clear that
only those powers which had been specifically granted to
them by law were valid. Executive departments and agencies
could pursue only those activities and p?rograms authorized
by Congress or the Constitution.
From the earliest days of the republic, it has
been the congressional phase of the appropriations process
which has provided the most effective means of control and
oversight over the executive agencies and departments. By
granting ~ or withholding ~ authority, to ob3.igate funds of
5joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of




the Treasury, the Congress has retained a position of power
and influence c
Before proceeding to an examination of the current
organization of Congress and its operations, a brief history
is provided of the development of the Executive/Legislative
budget process.
The Beginnings of the Executive/Legislative
Budget Process
In 1789? the House of Representatives appointed
a Select Committee on Ways and Means 9 which was to consider
and report on an "estimate of supplies." However, Alexander
Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, had been
granted wide authority "to prepare and report estimates of
public revenue and public expenditures," thus, minimizing
congressional involvement and control « With strong federalist
backing, in the Congress, Secretary Hamilton recommended
that appropriations be granted "under a few generalized
heads," His request was granted, and this practice was
followed until 1795. During this time, pressure was beginning
to mount in Congress for the exercise of a stronger voice
in government expenditures , Led by Albert Gallatin, the
Republicans expressed concern that Congress had abdicated
its constitutional responsibilities. In 1795» Secretary
Hamilton resigned,, The Republicans had gained a majority
in the House of Representatives, and the Ways and Means
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Committee was quickly re-established. The Committee *s first
task was to recoup congressional control over appropriations
and expenditures - and leverage over the executive depart-
ments - "by insisting that the large appropriation acts be
broken down into detailed itemization.
Thus, the conflict* between Congress and the
Executive over the matter of detailed itemization of
appropriations, as opposed to general programmatic
appropriations, is historical. Today, the strong con-
gressional resistance, to the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting concept advocated by the Executive Branch, is
due, in part, to this same basic controversy. The controversy
is not restricted to Congress and the Executive Branch.
There have also been differences of opinion within the
Congress. In 1?89» the House passed a military appropriations
bill containing detailed and specific itemization. The
Senate refused to agree to the detail and specification,
and passed an amendment consolidating all of the appropriations
into one general appropriation. The measure was finally
resolved in Joint Committee, when the House reluctantly
agreed to accept the consolidation. The controversy was
temporarily settled, but was far from resolved. These
differences in opinion remain, even today. The House of
Representatives is committed to the principle of itemization
in order to achieve the maximum degree of control and

oversight* The House takes its "control and oversight"
responsibilities seriously, and the Appropriations Committee
holds tenaciously to its prerogatives for funding of Federal
activities and the continuous surveillance of executive
departments and agencies.
In 1801. President Jefferson appointed Albert
Gallatin (Secretary Hamilton's long-time adversary) to the
position of Treasury-Secretary* Secretary Gallatin arranged
to have the next message to Congress recommend that
"appropriations be in specific sums to every specific
purpose susceptible to definition, that transfers of funds
from one purpose to another be prohibited and contingency
funds be reduced," The Secretary believed that detailed
itemization was essential, in order to assure strict
accountability for Federal expenditures. His new position,
»
no doubt, influenced him to further caution Congress that;
. » • the legislature could not foresee, in all its
details, the necessary applications of monies and
reasonable discretions should be allowed to the
proper executive departments.
6
The Ways and Means Committee was made a standing
committee in the House, in 1802. The Congress continued
its efforts to impose oversight and control over executive
agencies and departments by enacting splintered appropriations
6 Ibid., p. 51.
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and rigid, detailed legislation. By i860, the Ways and
Means Committee had be cone the most powerful and influential
committee in the House , and its Chairman was second only to
the Speaker of the House in prestige and power . The
Committee
s
as might be expected, resisted all efforts by
other House members to divide its work, and objected to
the suggested establishment of a separate Committee for
Appropriations. The division of authority would necessarily
result in a reduction of their power and influence.
Ways and Means was overwhelmed by the in sed
workload occasioned by the War Between The States. On
March 2, 186 St s- new committee was formed to review the
estimates and report the general appropriations bills
.
Following the lead of the Hoiise, in 1867* the Senate divided
the work of its Finance Committee, and established a
Committee on Appropriations.
From the very beginning, the House Appropriations
Committee was comprised of a conservative and highly dedicated
group of congressmen. Members appointed to Appropriations
were dedicated to "guarding the Treasury and reducing
government expenditures „ •* The goals and objectives, of the
House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees, are
described in a subsequent section. It is sufficient to note
here that their goals of economy and efficiency, in government,
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were not popular with the rest of Congress, Other members
resented the Committee's power to curtail and reject money-
requests, Members became particularly distressed when
Federal projects and activities for the benefit of their
own constituencies were "cut out and/or cut back," under
the watchful eyes of the Committee,
Adding to the burden of the Appropriations
Committee was the fact that this was a period of Treasury
surpluses in the United States, Thoughts of economy,
efficiency and balanced budgets were not popular among
members of Congress, Because of this dichotomy of
philosophies, regarding the expenditure of public funds,
members of the legislative committees conducted continual
assaults on Appropriations and its extraordinary powers,
Beginning in I877, and continuing in 1880 and
1885? the Appropriations Committee was systematically
stripped of its authority and powers. The House voted to
grant budget review authority to the various substantive
committees, which had jurisdiction over the particular
activity or program. In effect, the spending agencies
and departments dealt directly with their "authorizing"
substantive committees for funds. The result of this
arrangement was predictable. Federal expenditures increased
rapidly. There was no coordinated control or coordinated
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review of the Federal budget by Congress , or by the Executive
Branch, for that matter. Splintered responsibility, for
appropriations review and approval, continued until the
passage of the Budget and. Accounting Act of 1921 • The
Budget and Accounting Act provided for a single House
Appropriations Committee, which would be responsible for
all money measures* The House again tried to gain control
over Federal expenditures and executive activities and
programs
,
This review, of the historical development of
the Executive/Legislative budget process, has covered the
period from 1789 to 1921 The present arrangement and
structure of committees and subcommittees has remained
basically unchanged since 1921, Although the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19k6 attempted to make certain
refinements and improvements in congressional methods and
committee procedures, these efforts were largely unsuccess-
ful
.
With this background, a review of the current
organizational procedure for authorization and appropriation
of the Federal budget is appropriate.
Organization of the Congress
Committee/Subcommitt ee. Structure
At the forefront of most evaluations of Congress,
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and its procedures, are allegations of inefficiencies
in and condemnations of the committee system. Generally,
this type of complaint originates outside of Congress, but,
there have been occasions when an author or reporter has
been able to quote a Congressman or iSenator uttering his
disenchantment and dissatisfaction. Before describing the
specific proposed reform measures, relating to the committee
and subcommittee structure, a closer look at the committee
system may be valuable.
Criticism of the committee structure is not new,
Woodrow Wilson referred to committees as "little legislature,'.;,"
and described the process of government as "a government
by standing committee," The main objective of his remarks
was to encourage reform of Congress, The reform proposed
was to be accomplished by changes in the committee system,
7
It is generally conceded that the majority of work
of Congress is performed in the committee/subcommittee
environment. Bills, reported out of committee, are subjected
to only superficial review by the parent chamber. This
review is slight in comparison to the detailed and exhaustive
work required in the preparation of the bill, Egger and
Harris provide confirmation, in The President and Congress;
7woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, (Boston:





The real business of Congress is transacted in its
Committees j what takes place on the floor is normally
the ratifications without significant change, of
v.
rhat has been decided in the committees,"
The tremendous workload precludes individual
congressmen from assuming a generalist role in legislative
matters „ Members must be content to achieve a degree of
specialization in certain, limited fields and to rely on
their fellow members for expertise and counsel in other
areas. This is the principle of reciprocity, which most
members of Congress find indispensable.. The House is able
to cope with its workload through specialization,,
Congressional committees are powerful and function
for the most part as autonomous units. Autonomy is not
absolute, however. The committee is still responsible to
its parent body* But, it can enjoy a great amount of
independence in its day-to-day operations. Its independence
and autonomy are threatened only when the committee members
fail, in some drastic way, to live up to the expectations
of the parent body. If the committee members' conduct
warrants, either individually or collectively, the parent
body can impose disciplinary sanctions. Sanctions may involve
failure to provide support on the floor or organized opposition
"Rowland Egger and Joseph P. Karris, The President
and Congress
,




to a committee report or bill More serious sanctions might
involve stripping the committee of some of its powers and/
or limiting its legislative jurisdiction*
Defeat on the floor, in either body of a committee-
sponsored bill, results in a loss of prestige and influence
for the committee and its members. A committee will avoid
defeat on the floor, if at all possible, Avoidance can
include intentional failure to report out a measure that is
given little chance of passage Legislation of this type
is re-worked and re-written exhaustively, until such time
as it is given a good chance of being enacted e Most battles
over legislation are conducted in committee Seldom are
differences brought to the floor s This is especially true
in the House, And it is especially true within appreciations
committees e
The committees hire their own staff personnel, and
establish their own rules of procedure. The committee meets
at the chaii'man's call, and meetings proceed at e. pace
satisfactory to the members. Most important work takes
pla.ee in "closed" or "executive" sessions. Again, this is
especially true in the House, All House Appropriations
Committee hearings are "closed," Accordingly, the proceedings
of the committees are often kept from public view. The
"closed" meetings aid in the "socialization process" of
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members. Committee and subcommittee unity is enhanced.
"Closed" meetings facilitate open and candid discussion of
pending legislation. The members can search for consensus
or compromise, rather than create a majority/minority split
over a contested solution. When the solution is subsequently
reported out of committee, members usually rally in support
of the report and its recommendations. Minority reports
are rare in the House , and such reports are especially rare
in the House Appropriations Committee. This appraisal is
substantiated by The Congressman, His Work as He Sees It :
The influence of committees in the legislative process
is bolstered by the practice, particularly prevalent in
the Appropriations Committee, of confining efforts to
defeat or modify a proposal to activities with the
committee itself . Once the battle has been fought and
resolved there, those in the committee minority often
do not press their case en the House floor. The
emphasis is on closing ranks and presenting a united
front .9
The committee system and infra-structure help to
satisfy a member's needs for power, prestige, recognition
and respect as an individual. In the smaller units provided
by the committee/subcommittee structure, the member can
perform a meaningful role. By hard work, and achieving a
degree of specialization in a particular field of interest,
the member can earn respect, influence, power and a personal
^Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman - H is Work as
He Sees It, (Washington, D. C, : The"" Brookings Institution,




The committee system is important to individual
] :bers of Congress. Any reform measure, to be successful,
must take proper cognizance of the personal needs and goals
of congressmen. It is, at best, difficult for a member to
achieve his personal goals or to perform as an individual
in the larger, parent body. In the House, he must compete
with *l-35 congressmen for the floor, But, members can find
meaningful work, an individual role, solidarity, trust,
respect, and high esprit in the committee/subcommittee
environment e
An integral part of any discussion of the committee
system is a recognition of the power and influence of committee
chairmen,, All committee chairmanships are prestigious
positions. However, pre-eminent among the committee chair-
men is the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.
The latter is usually accorded a position of influence,
second only to that of the Speaker of the House e
A review of the duties and authority serves to
establish the wide-ranging scope and power of the committee
chairmen. The chairman calls committee meetings and schedules
the order of business. As presiding officer at meetings, he
recognizes members who wish to speak or to question witnesses.
The chairman decides on the order in which bills will be
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taken up in committee. He controls and directs the committee
staff. An important power is the control over subcommittees.
The committee chairman establishes subcommittees, selects
subcommittee members and appoints the subcommittee chairman.
He determines the scope of legislative jurisdiction to be
assigned to the subcommittee. The committee chairman
approves requests for member travel on committee/subcommittee
business. When bills are reported out of committee, the
chairman acts as floor manager. Should a Conference Committee
be necessarji", and such a reconciliation is invariably necessary
for appropriations measures, the chairman serves as the
senior member of the House/Senate delegation.
To become a committee chairman, a legislator must
have served continuously on a particular committee longer
than any other member of his party. He must, of course, be
a member of the majority. This seniority principle has
often been criticized- in the news media and. literature.
But, there does not seem to be a great amount of support
for changing the system within the Congress. Congressmen
apparently believe that the present system is superior to
the proposed alternatives, which may prove to be even more
dysfunctional. The seniority principle serves to promote
stability and a degree of conservatism within Congress.
Critics of the seniority system complain that the chairman-
ships are not assigned on the basis of talent, ability or

constituency representation. These critics maintain that
winning a chairmanship is simply a matter of endurance.
Though endurance, alone, may not be considered a sufficient
virtue, surely it is a positive indication of political
attractiveness and competent performance, as registered at
the election polls by the member's constituents.
Although subjects of specialization and reciprocity
have already been briefly defined, their importance, especially
in the House, provide the basis for further discussion.
The tremendous volume of work, placed on Congress,
has forced a formal sub-division of the legislative effort.
The sub-division has been accomplished by forming numerous
subcommittees* As previously discussed, most of the work
is performed at the subcommittee level. The review of bills,
by the full Committee, is usually perfunctory and superficial.
Similarly, the measures are not debated at length on the
floor of the House.
A large increase in the number of subcommittees
came almost immediately after passage of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19^6. This Act reduced the number of
standing committees. The decrease, in standing committees,
resulted in creating a wider legislative jurisdiction for
those remaining committees. The expanded jurisdiction, and
increasing workload, made the sub-division of labor inevitable.
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Congressmen manage to cope with the legislative
workload by specializing in a particular area; then they
rely on congressional colleagues for aid and advice in
determining a position on proposed "bills or subjects,
which are beyond their specific fields of competence and
knowledge.
In describing the principle of reciprocity and
the deference to recognized specialists, Richard Fenno, Jr.
writes, as follows:
Only by specializing can they (Congress) unearth the
volume of information necessary for the intelligent;,
critical screening of budget requests. Only by
developing their own expertise can Committee members
successfully counter the battery of experts sent down
by each executive agency to defend its budget. 10
The specific details of the selection process,
for membership on congressional committees, and this process
does differ between the two political parties, is not
discussed in this report,, However, a word concerning the
philosophy of selection criteria, as between the appropriations
committee and the substantive committees, is considered
germane and appropriate. For example, the House Appropriations
Committee is formed deliberately with members who are
disinterested in the programs that they will vote to finance.
lORi chard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse -
APP^2E?.^^£IL^J>°\i.li£.?L in Congres s7 TBoston: Little, Brown
and Company"t 1 966 ) , pT 162.
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On balance, Appropriations Committee members tend to be
negatively motivated toward government spending , economy
minded and relatively free from spending pressure by their
constituencies
,
The substantive committees, in contrast, are often
formed with members having personal, ideological and/or
constituency interest in the particular subject area, The
substantive committee members are more often strongly
oriented toward program support, continua/tion and growth
in the fa\ ored areas
.
The patterns of committee member selection criteria
reduce to: (1) constituency or personal interest, or (2)
no personal or vested interest in the siibject area.
Obviously, the latter criterion is more compatible with
the "budget-cutting" role of House Appropriations Committee
members. The following quote, from the Congressional Quarterly,
though somewhat dated, substantiates the point:
On the basis of a I960, district by district analysis
of military installations, 3 of the 5 members of the
Military Construction Subcommittee, and 7 of the 14
members of the Defense Department Subcommittee, were
without a single military installation in their districts.
The average number of military installations per member
of the latter subcommittee was 1 1/2; whereas, the
average number per member of the authorizing committee -
the Armed Services Committee was 3»
11 Congressional Quarterly Service, Congressional
Quarterly, (Washington, D. C. : Congressional Quarterly
Service, March, 19ol), pp. ^63-^78.
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The committees and subcommittees do not restrict
their efforts to the legislative process. After enacting
legislation, members assume the tasks related to exercising
oversight and control over the executive agencies and depart-
ments e Appropriations Committee members are particularly
interested in the conduct of programs and activities for
which they have provided funds. In this regard, Joseph
Harris writes:
• „ . the powerful and hard-working House and Senate
Appropriations Committees of recent years, which,
acting through subcommitties, not only systematically
and minutely enquire into the administration of
policies and programs when they review the itemized
budget requests of all executive agencies, but also
exercise continuing surveillance over agency activities
through the year,^
Discussion, thus far, has centered on the House
of Representatives and its committee structure and per-
formance. Turning to the Senate, the reader villi recall
that the Appropriations Committee was established, in l86'/o
The Appropriations Committee was directed to provide financing
to Federal programs and activities as such programs and
activities were authorized by the Congress. The Senate
Appropriations Committee was to ensure economy and efficiency
in Federal programs through continuous oversight of the
Executive Branch. Unlike the House, where membership on




the Appropriations Committee is exclusive, the Senate enjoys
substantial overlapping of memberships between committees.
In the House, membership on Appropriations, Rules, or Ways
and Means precludes membership on any other committee,
except special or joint committee assignments. As a result
of service on both the substantive (or authorizing)
committees and the Appropriations Committee, Senators tend
to lean toward program support, in lieu of economy, efficiency
and reduced expenditures. This dual membership serves to
reduce the conflict between substantive committees and the
Appropriations Committee. These inter-locking memberships
require a great deal of time, however s and the Senate is
unable to conduct a detailed review of legislation. The
Senate is forced to take an incremental approach. Since
it usually acts after the House, the Senate can restrict
its attention to appeals from House action. Senate
consideration of appropriations requests is less extensive,
less thorough and less time-consuming than that in the
House.
Congress is apparently satisfied with the committee/
subcommittee structure. The esprit, solidarity and integration
of committee members have been primarily instrumental in
warding off congressional reform over the years. This has
been, and is today, especially true in the House. Most
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reform proposals would effect a redistribution of power.
Any such redistribution would, at least partially, destroy
the present structure of authority and influence . Richard
Fenno, Jr„ describes committee integration and resistance
to reform proposals:
( . the internal integration of this Committee
(Appropriations) helps to explain the extraordinary
stability, since 1920, of appropriations procedures -
in the face of repeated proposals to change them
through omnibus appropriations, legislative budgets,
new budgetary forms, item veto, Treasury borrowing,
etc« i 3
And again citing Fenno, here from Power o f the
Purse , a vote of confidence in the committee system:
Most convincing, perhaps, is the simple fact that,
despite repeated proposals to alter the basic House-
Committee relationship, it remains, in 1965? virtually
as it was mandated in 1920 8 Forty-five years of
reform ideas, agitated for both in and out of the
House - the legislative budget, the omnibus
appropriation bill, the item veto, the Joint
Committee on the Budget, the alternate budget
year, etc,,, have virtually come to naught in the
chamber.
^
In summary, the House, in its committee structure,
is more of a working organization. The House considers
legislation, in detail, and members become specialists in
particular areas of governmental activity. Committee
13Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations
Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration,"
The Ameri can Politi cal S cience Review , LV I (June, 1962), pp.
310-32^, reprinted in Congressional Reform: Probl ems and
Prospects t Edited by Joseph S, Clark ~, (New York: Thomas Y,
Crowell, 1965) t P. 27^.
l^Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. ^6,
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membership is limited in the House. Members may serve on
only one of the major committees (Appropriations, Rules
and Ways and Means)* Congressmen, in contrast to Senators,
have a limited constituency and local interests and
parochialism are more often factors of consideration. The
Senate has a national interest and national outlook on
legislation.
The degree of floor debate, in the two bodies,
differs markedly. The House drastically limits debate.
This is considered a necessity in the House due to the
larger membership. The Senate, on the other hand, enjoys
almost unlimited debate. The smaller body (100 members
as compared to ^35 in the House) can afford the extravagence
of unlimited debate without apparent difficulty. Although
many consider the often-used practice of filibustering as
dysfunctional, the Senate has not seen fit to adopt rules
to limit the right of debate or to make cloture simpler to
invoke c
The following Chapter discusses major reform




SIGNIFICANT REFORM LEGISLATION AND COMMISSION REPORTS
The Budget and Accounting Act of 192 1
In the preceding Chapter, a brief history of the
Executive/Legislative roles in the appropriations process
was given. Historical events and legislative milestones
,
which influenced these relationships, were described. This
history revealed that there had been little change in the
budgetary process since the earliest days of the republic.
However, growing pressures for change and reform
were being demonstrated in the private sector as well as in
Congress, These pressures eventually led to the passage
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 e
Resentment toward old traditions and institutions
in Congress erupted in a revolt against the autocratic
rule exercised by the Speaker of the House. In 1910, the
Speaker of the House was systematically stripped of much
of his power. As a result, the standing committees, and
their chairmen, assumed greater authority. There were many
factors which led to this revolt and several major changes,
in House structure and committee procedure, followed.




the changes which followed, are beyond the scops of this
report* The point to be made is that the Congress was in
a mood for reform, which was a reflection of public sentiment
and the mounting pressure for reform.
Mention has been made of the increased Federal
spending, which followed the decision to distribute
appropriations responsibilities among the various substantive
committees o Since the late l800's, Executive Branch depart-
ments and agencies had submitted appropriations requests
directly to the substantive committee having jurisdiction
over its particular programs and activities. Spending
estimates and requests, for funds originated by the depart-
ments and agencies, were routed via the office of the
Secretary of the Treasury* The Secretary, however, was not
authorized to change, modify or revise them. After several
years of increasing deficits, Congress decided to shift
responsibility to the President for balancing the budget
and ending the "gross extravagenee, " Congress passed the
Sundry Civil Appropriations Act on March k, 1909. The Act
charged the President with responsibility for reviewing both
appropriations requests and estimates of revenue. In
discharging this responsibility, the President was to recommend
reduced spending or increased revenues, from taxes or loans,
in order to fund unavoidable deficits.
The President did not waste time in exercising his
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new authority. Executive Branch department heads were
directed to review their respective bureau and offices'
budget submissions, prior to congressional action. Passage
of the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act was the first move
toward enactment of legislation providing for a unified
national budget.
On March 8, 1911 i the Commission on Economy and
Efficiency was established by President Taft. In submitting
the Commission report to Congress, in 1912, President Taft
requested that a national budget system be adopted. Congress
did not respond to the President's recommendation,, However,
the concept of a national budget had aroused a great deal of
public support and remained a popular issue. In 191 6,
reacting to increasing public pressure, both major political
parties included a national budget system plank in their
respective platforms.
In 1919* the House appointed a Select Committee on
the Budget to consider existing financial system problems and
to propose legislation for a national budget system. The
Select Committee reached agreement at the outset, that such
a system was both desirable and urgently required. The
lengthy discussions and hearings, which followed, involved
decisions as to the type of s^gency to be established to
operate the national budget system. The Select Committee
questioned whether the national budget should be prepared

by the Office of the President or by the Treasury Department
under Presidential direction,, The Select Committee urged
the establishment of an independent office or agency to audit
the budget/expenditure process. This office was to be
responsible directly to Congress; was to help strengthen
congressional control over the appropriations process; and,
was to serve as a counter-balance to the proposed Bureau
of the Budget « The establishment of the General Accounting
Office with a Comptroller General resulted from these
discussions and hearings.
The Select Committee reported its findings and
recommendations, and the bill was passed, overwhelmingly,
by the House of Representatives.
The Senate, being currently involved in its
consideration of the Versailles Treaty, delayed action on
the bill for a year. In 1920, the bill was passed by the
Senate, and the President was granted authority and respon-
sibility for preparing a unified national budget for the
Federal government. But, the national budget system was
not yet to be! President Wilson, though in favor of the
budgetary system, vetoed the bill. The President objected
to provisions, which had been written into the bill, relating
to the authority for removal of the Comptroller General. He
considered these provisions to be an affront to the Chief
Executive, and vetoed the bill on this basis.
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The follovring year, 192.1, President Harding signed
the measure after the controversial removal provision bad
been changed from a required "concurrent resolution" to
a "joint resolution," With the President's signature, the
bill became the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 6
Q)The Act authorized the President to prepare and
submit an annual budget covering revenues and expenditures
for the last completed fiscal year, estimates for the current
fiscal year, and the requested program for the upcoming
fiscal yearw—-'The Act established the Bureau of the Budget
to assist the President in the preparation of the Federal
budget o At first located in the Treasury Department, the
Bureau of the Budget was transferred to the Executive Office
of the President, in 1939c In preparing the annual Federal
budget, the Bureau of the Budget was authorized to "assemble,
correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the estimates of the
several departments and establishments,"^ The relationships
between the various Executive Branch departments and agencies
and their corresponding substantive committees in Congress
would never again be the same.
Enacted on June 10, 192'J. , the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, came 132 years after the signing of the
^Congressional Quarterly Service, Federal Economic




Constitution, The Act still did not contain any changes in
the organization and procedure of Congress for reviewing
and approving appropriations legislation.
Several changes did occur, however, both in the
House and the Senate, The House, in 1920, adopted a
resolution providing for the re-assignment of all appropriations
bills to a single appropriations committee. This was an effort
to recapture congressional control and coordination over
money bills. In 1922, the Senate also recreated a single
Appropriations Committee, But, the re-establishment of the
single appropriations committees, in the two bodies, did not
have the full anticipated results. The President's unified
budget was still broken down into numerous pieces and assigned
to various subcommittees for review, hearings and recommendations
to the full Committee, The piecemeal and fragmented review
process continued as before and the budget was not reviewed
as an overall financial plan by Congress,
As a result of their restored authority, the con-
servative and economy-minded House Appropriations Committee
did manage to slow the government spending rates. As the
period was one of increasing prosperity and budget surpluses,
there was little congressional support or interest in economy
and efficiency in government spending.
Congress continued to fragment the overall financial
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plan of the President. The subcommittees continued to
function as autonomous, independent units subject to little
control or coordination by the full committees and parent
bodies e James MacGregor Burns, writing in Presidential
Government
,
evaluated the effort to re-establish a single,
coordinated committee for appropriations review:
The congressional effort to integrate its own
appropriation activities was largely abortive;
especially in the House, the new Appropriations
Committee spawned subcommittees that operated
with almost the same mutual tolerance and indepen-
dence as had the separate appropriations committees
before 1920. l6
In shorty the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
most certainly made the Office of the President stronger
in budgetary matters in comparison to Congress. The fear,
previously expressed by the Select Committee, that this
would happen, proved to be justified. The General Accounting
Office was originally established as a counter-balance to
BOB to maintain the status quo. However, Congress has been
accused of negligence in its v.se of this agency, and
specifically, the House Appropriations Committee has resisted
greater use of GAO. The Appropriations Committee , on the
contrary, has acted to block increased activity on the part
of GAO by denying that agency certain requested funds. The
l°James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government;
The Crucibl e of Leadershi p, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin
Company, 196~6~7, p. 71.
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widely reported matter of withholding funds, which were
requested by GAO to implement "expenditure accounting" in
the government, is an example. The Senate supported proposal
for "expenditure accounting" has ostensibly been stalled in
the House Rules Committee, but, it is generally conceded that
strong pressures from the Appropriations Committee have
helped to keep the measure off the floor in the House.
The Legislative Reorgani zation Act of 19^-6
The next major reform legislation was the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19h6 9 A Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress had "been established and charged
with the responsibility for reviewing congressional procedures
and making recommendations for improving and refining control
and oversight by the Congress over the Executive Branch
agencies and departments.
Although, the enabling resolution which created the
Joint Coinnittee had placed severe restrictions on the scope
of its investigations, the resulting report acknowledged
many deficiencies in congressional procedures. The Joint
Committee observed that Congress had not adequately equipped
itself in order to cope with the pressures of the executive
departments and agencies for larger appropriations . The
Joint Committee made many recommendations, including the
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hiring of larger congressional staffs and adopting a
Legislative Budget.^?
The Act did authorize larger congress i02ial
professional staffs, as had been recommended. Passage of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19*1*6 marked the
establishment of the congressional staff system. The
increased staffing of committees was an effort on the part
of Congress to counter the rapid growth and increasing
power of the Executive Branch. This growth and power,
relative to Congress, had been especially pronounced
following the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
Even though congressional budget decisions are,
in the final analysis, political decisions, few would disagree
that an experienced professional staff can provide invaluable
assistance to Congress. Thus, though political, decisions
can be more rationally determined as a result of broader
knowledge.
As Federal activities and programs increase and
expand, Congress has sought to maintain its control over
Executive Branch operations, and most particularly those
activities which are politically sensitive. Since the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 19-^6, and the provisions
17u. S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress, Re-port to Accompany the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19*1-6, S. Rept. 1011, 79th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 19*1-6, pp. 1-2.
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for additional professional staff, the Congress has been
better able to increase its influence and control over
Administration activities and operations.
Contrary to the actions of most congressional
committees, the House Appropriations Committee refused to
increase the size of its staff. Many reasons have been
advanced for this refusal, but the following points summarize
the rationale
:
1. Increased staffing was denied by the seniority
structure. The senior members of the Appropriations
Committee enjoyed adequate staff support already and did
not appreciate a need for additional staffing for junior
members 8
2, The Appropriations Committee members consider their
proceedings highly confidential. In their quest to keep
these proceedings confidential, they wanted to restrict
information to members only. In effect, they felt that they
could not trust or control a larger professional staff. This
idea was also advanced as a reason for the Appropriations
Committee not making greater utilization of the General
Accounting Office.
3c The increased numbers of professional staff may come
to compete with the Executive Branch as a bureaucracy; the




The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 also
provided for a Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget.
The Joint Committee was to meet early in each session of
Congress for the purpose of considering the President's
budget as a whole. After appropriate review of the overall
financial plan, and in consideration of current economic
conditions and fiscal status, the Joint Committee was to
establish an annual ceiling on appropriations and expendi-
tures for the government. The Legislative Budget, though a
commendable effort on the part of Congress to effect an
overall review of the President's financial plan, was doomed
to failure.
In 19^7* the Joint Committee on the Legislative
Budget did reach agreement and reported a ceiling for
appropriations and expenditures, but the House and Senate
failed to reach agreement on the Committee's recommendation.
Again, in 19^-8, & ceiling on appropriations was reported out
by the Joint Committee. Neither the House nor the Senate
enforced the recommended ceiling. After the frustration
of 19^-8, the Joint Committee became inactive. Section 138?
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19^6, the Legislative
Budget concept, is still good law. This section has not been
repealed or amended.
The Legislative Budget concept had some active
support in Congress, especially in the Senate, and this

support was used to garner acceptance of the Omnibus
Appropriations approach in 1950. The Omnibus Appropriations
proposal provided for all general appropriations measures
to be incorporated into one act. The procedure was voluntarily
tried in 1950, but the appropriations measure did not pass
the Senate until August h, of that year, and was not signed
into law by the President until September 6„ The new
procedure was blamed for the delay in passage e In 1950, the
Korean War served to make the Omnibus Appropriations Act
obsolete by the time of its passage, The Defense Department
had already begun to propose large supplemental appropriations
measures in consequence of the War.
The President objected to the Omnibus Appropriations
concept. He did not have power to reject parts of the
measure, without rejecting the entire bill. This is the
so-called Item Veto, which Congress has not deemed appropriate
to extend to the President.
The Omnibus Appropriations approach and the
Legislative Budget have not been tried again,, Congress has
not found an acceptable way to review the President's financial
plan for estimated revenues and expenditures in one piece.
The impetus behind passage of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19^-6 was to, once again, recapture
congressional control over executive departments and agencies.
The House also reflected the general public's demands to
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red-ace Federal spending, promote economy and efficiency in
government and strive for a balanced budget*
As briefly mentioned earlier when the committee/
subcommittee structure was being described, the Legislative
Reorganization Act of l cjk6 consolidated and reduced the
number of standing committees. Standing committees were
reduced from eighty-one to thirty-four. In the House, the
number of committees was reduced from forty-eight to
nineteen. In the Senate, the number reduced was from thirty-
three to fifteen. With the reduction of standing committees,
the remaining committees were given wider jurisdiction and
authority for legislation. In order to cope with the
increased workload, sub-division of labor became a necessity,,
Subcommittees blossomed with added benefit of special authority,
influence and power. Prestige and status of subcommittee
chairmen and members soa.red, but the net effect was to the
overall disadvantage of Congress from the standpoint of
information flow, representation of constituents, and
coordination of effort.
In summary, the Legislative Reorganization Act of
19^6 was evidence that Congress did recognize its weaknesses
and indicated a serious attempt to correct some of these
deficiencies. The Act charged the Committees on Government
Operations with responsibility for all legislation relating
to budgeting and accounting measures, other than
appropriations, and for exercising continuous surveillance

over the execution of budgeting and accounting laws. Past
efforts of the Senate Committee and current efforts by both
houses are described subsequently.
Though not strictly a budgetary reform effort, the
Employment Act of 1946 must be noted. This Act established
the Council of Economic Advisors in the Executive Office of
the President, The Council of Economic Advisors completed
a "troika" of Presidential advisors, consisting of the
Chairman of the CEA, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, The "troika" shares
responsibility for advising the President on economic and
fiscal policies for the Federal government.
The Employment Act of 19~\-6 also established the
Joint Economic Committee in Congress. This Committee was
originally called the Committee on the Economic Report, The
Joint Economic Committee has provided the Congress with a
broad.er perspective on national economic policy and the
economic implications of the Federal budget. The Committee
was not originally, and is not at present, formally included
in the congressional budget authorization-appropriation
process. The JEC performs an educational function, with its
hearings and testimony from various public and private
economic officials, for both the public and Congress, 1 "
l^Reuben E. Slesinger and Asher Isaacs, Business
,
Government and Public Policy, (New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 19o&T» PP. 212-218,
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Notwithstanding the "reform activity" of 1946,
Congress has altered little its methods and procedures for
control over Executive Branch spending. Today, neither the
Senate nor the House successfully performs any coordinated
review of appropriations legislation. The primary obstruction
to such a coordinated review is the traditional appropriations
process «.
• . , the major impediments to effective, consistent
consideration and determination of broad fiscal
policies by Congress reside in the structure and
methods of the appropriations process itself. 1 ^
While there have been few changes in the congressional
phase of the budgetary process, there have been many changes
in the executive phase. Improvements and refinements in
the executive phase have resulted, in large measure, from
the several Presidential Commissions, which have critically
examined Executive Branch methods and procedures,, These
commission reports are analyzed in the following section.
The First Hoover Commission (1 9^9)
In February, 19^9* the Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government (First Hoover
Commission) reported its findings and recommendations on
"Budgeting and Accounting" in the Executive Branch. Though
no recommendations were included, which would change congressional
l^Harris, Congressional Control, p. 6?»
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procedures or methods directly, the changes proposed for
the Executive Branch would result in certain profound
residual effects on Congress. The importance and timeliness
of these investigations were emphasized in the Commission
Report:
The time has come when the budgeting and accounting
system of the Federal government must be modernized.
Unless this is done, the Congress, the Executive Branch,
and the public will be unable intelligently to judge
the wisdom of the proposed expenditures and the
effectiveness of past expenditures, 20
Among the recommendations submitted by the First
Hoover Commission, for improving budgeting and accounting,
were:
I. The adoption of a budget based on functions, activities,
and projects o The Hoover Commission called this concept a
"performance budget,"
2 e A complete appraisal and revision of the appropriation
structures
3, The separation, in the estimates, of current operating
expenditures and capital or investment-type outlays,
h, A clarification of the President's authority to effect
reductions in expenditures below the appropriated amounts
,
so long as the purposes authorized by Congress were
accomplished.
2°Report of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch o f the Government to the Congress, Herbert
Hoover, Chairman, "Washington, D, C, : Government Printing
Office, 19^9), P. 1.
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5« The establishment of an Accountant General under the
Secretary of the Treasury. The Accountant General would have
been given authority to prescribe general accounting methods
and enforce accounting procedures. The Accountant General
would combine agency accounts into summary accounts of the
government and produce reievent reports for the President
,
Congress, and the public.
There were a number of additional recommendations
with respect to the internal operation and structure of the
Bureau of the Budgets Included with the Commission Report
were the following recommendations of the Commission Task
Force on Accounting:
1. Adoption of accrual basis in .accounting for both
revenues and expenditures.
2* Establish uniform departmental practices, procedures,
nomenclature, better inventory and public debt accounting
in order to reduce staff and red tape. *
The most important recommendation of the First
Hoover Commission involved the introduction of the "perform-
ance budget" concept. The emphasis would be placed on
"what was to be accomplished," rather than on "what resources
are necessary for accomplishment." This concept, though not
identical, was a forerunner of program budgeting. Program
21lbid c , p. h2.

48
budgeting, as now implemented in the Department of Defense
and several other executive departments and agencies,
involves the establishment of goals and objectives, searching
for and evaluating alternative means of accomplishing the
stated goals and objectives, and finally, selecting from
among the alternatives the preferred means of accomplishment.
As a result of the First Hoover Commission, the
Executive Branch implemented a number of improvements in
its phase of the budgetary process. Congress chose to
continue with its former methods and procedures. Commission
recommendations, relating to "performance budgets," the
separation of capital and current operating expenditures,
the establishment of an Accountant General, and the imple-
mentation of accrual accounting failed to raise sufficient
support in Congress.
The Second Hoover Commission (195 5)
In June, 1955» the Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government (Second Hoover
Commission) submitted its report to Congress, The
Commission's report included the following statement of
purpose:
The primary purpose of the Commission's task force
was to ascertain the effectiveness of budgetary and
accounting performance in the executive agencies, to
appraise their points of strength and weakness, and
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to make suggestions for the further development of
what is good, and the elimination of deficiencies. 22
The Second Hoover Commission recommended the
following improvements in Executive Branch budgeting and
accounting methods and procedures
:
1, Increase Bureau of the Budget resources and expand
functions for overall improved effectiveness,
2, Institute annual report on performance from spending
agencies to the Bureau of the Budget, BOB would render a
summary report on performance to the President.
3* Implement cost-based operating budgets for the
allocation of fundse Require periodic agency reports on
performance as against the budget in order to justify
allocation,
4, Stressed desirability of "performance budgets" as
recommended by the First Hoover Commission.
5» Urged agencies to proceed with the synchronization of
organization structure, accounting and budget classifications
and systems.
6. Implement cost-base estimates for formulating and
administering department and agency budgets.
These recommendations were primarily directed at
2
2
Report of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government to the Congress , Herbe r
t
Hoover, Chairman, (Washington, D. C, : Government Printing
Office, 1955), P. X.
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improving and refining budgeting, control and administration
within the Executive.
The Second Hoover Commission then turned its
attention to the "restoration of congressional control of
the purse." In order to strengthen congressional control
over executive departments and agencies, the Commission
Report included the following recommendations
:
1. The Federal budget and appropriations acts should
be expressed in terms of estimated annual accrued expendi-
tures,, Only charges for the cost of goods and services
estimated to be received during the budget year would be
considered as expenditures. The annual accrued expenditures
budget would replace the present "obligational authority"
budget » which often results in large cash carry-overs from
year to year.
2. Legislation for continuing special programs, which
are not susceptible to the customary budgetary controls on
an annual basis, should nevertheless be enacted for a definite,
limited period of time. This would permit Congress to
conduct periodic reviews of the applicability and continued
usefulness of these special programs.
Three Commissioners (Clarence J. Brown, James A.
Farley and Chet Holifield) submitted dissenting views to the
majority report regarding the recommendations for budgetary
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control changes o Commissioner Holifield voiced his objections
as follows
:
Whether these technical recommendations actually
would tighten congressional control of the public purse
and bring about improvements in management and greater
economies, as claimed, is difficult to determine c The
end result of the Commission's recommendations may be
formal consistency in accounting principles rather than
actual gains in economy and efficiency. 2 3
In any event, after fifteen years, cost-based
estimates and annual accrued expenditures for budgetary
purposes have still not been effected. Appropriations are
approved by Congress as "new obligational authority," and
the cash carry-over problem is still very much a reality.
The President's Budget for Fis cal Year 197 contained
recommendations for appropriations and other new budget
authority of $210 .1 billion for Fiscal Year 1970. Of this
amount, $1^3«9 billion required legislative action by
Congress. The remaining authority became available under
existing law without action by the current Congress.^
The net effect of the two Hoover Commissions was
the refinement of the budgetary process in the Executive
Branch. These critical professional, and non-partisan
analyses of Federal budget and accounting procedures resulted
2 3lbid., pp. 71-72.
2^U. S., President, The Budget of the United States ,






It has often been suggested that a commission-type
investigation of Congress would be beneficial. However, it
is unlikely that Congress would voluntarily submit to such
scrutiny. In fact, Congress has continued to demand
executive budget submissions in traditional format and
detailed justification of end-item expenditures. And so,
even where budgetary improvements have been effected in an
executive area, Congress has stood firm, and has rejected
all suggestions to improve its procedures.
The President's Commission on Budget Concepts
The President's Commission on Budget Concepts is
the last commission discussed in this report. The Commission
was appointed by President Johnson in March, 1967, In the
appointing letter, the Commission was requested to study the
problems involved in presenting the budget to Congress and
to the public, and to make appropriate recommendations for
improvement. The Commission e s Report, submitted in October,
1967» suggested a new budget format which would reduce
confusion, but would provide the necessary information for
decision-making regarding Federal economic and fiscal policy.
Decisions involving the level of economic activity and the
allocation of limited resources among competing programs and
activities would be made easier. The new format was called
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the Unified Federal Budget.
The sixteen member Commission on Budget Concepts
was headed by David K. Kennedy. The bi-partisan group
included the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees, Administration
officials, university economists and spokesmen for the
private financial community.
The Commission Report acknowledged that the former
Federal budget formats (the administrative, the consolidated
cash, and the national income accounts budgets) were essentially
sound and useful. The Commission praised the ability and
devotion of civil servants involved in budget formulation
and submission. The Commission recognized, however, that
certain improvements were needed in order to make the budget
format and content more meaningful to its many users: the
President; Congress; and the public. In its Report,
recommending the new Unified Budget format, the Commission
cited a need:
• . . for certain changes in concepts and in classifi-
cation that will enhance public and congressional
understanding of the budget and will increase its
usefulness for purposes of decision-making, public
policy determination, and financial planning. ^5
25Report of the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts to the President of the United States , David .
Kennedy, Chairman, (V/ashington, D. C: Government Printing
Office, 1967), p. VII.
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The Commission reported complete unanimity among
its members regarding the main proposal, i e e
,
the Unified
Federal budget. There were dissenting reports and reser-
vations on various other recommendations in the Report.
The Commission submitted a total of thirteen recommendations,
which included:
1. The Federal budget should be formulated and submitted
on an accrual basis rather than a cash basis for both
revenues and expenditures,
2. The budget summary should include a "means of financing"
section for any anticipated deficits.
3. Interestingly, the Commission recommended against a
"capital budget," which would separate current operating
expenditures from capital or investment-type expenditures.
The Unified Federal Budget is comprehensive and
Integrated. The format separates requested authority from
existing budget authority, which becomes available for
obligation without further action by Congress. The format
includes receipts, expenditures, and net lending as part of
the government's total financial plan.
The President's Commission on Budget Concepts was
further evidence of the Executive's efforts to improve and
refine budgeting and accounting procedures. The Commission
review was timely and necessary because:
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l e Confusion and misunderstanding characterized the
former "budget formats. Various budgetary formats and
accounting concepts competed, and final decisions regarding
format were not always based on a desire for clarity and
full disclosure.
2. A lack of consensus concerning appropriate accounting
techniques to apply to certain items or groups of items
tended to distort budget totals.
3« Congress and the public demanded a clearer, more
informative budget format.
In his appointment, President Johnson gave the
following reasons for establishing the Commission:
The Federal Budget is a vital document e The Federal
Budget is a complex document. It is vital because it
affects the lives of every man, woman and child in this
nation. It is complex because it encompasses the full
scope of the Federal government's activities. Yet,
because of its complexity and scope, there are few
who understand it. The study this group is to undertake
should assist both public and congressional understanding
of this important document, 26
The Commission Report stated that it had not evaluated
the institutional arrangements for Executive Branch budget
preparation and review. Neither did the Commission review
the methods and procedures of Congress in authorizing and
appropriating funds as requested in the Federal budget. The




constancy and completeness in developing the new Unified
Federal Budget. The new format was first used in Fiscal
Year 1969, and was continued in Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971.
This concludes the survey of major reform legislation
and commission reports which have had an influence on the
budgetary process. With the exception of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19*4-6, most of the efforts at reform
and improvement have occurred in the Executive Branch phase
of the budgetary process. The Act of 19*4-6 was a commendable
effort, however f several of its major reforms were subsequently
abandoned by Congress as non-workable. As a result, the
Office of the President has become more professional and
efficient in the budgetary process as compared to Congress.
Executive Branch procedures and organizations, having been
subjected to professional review, detailed scrutiny, and
constructive criticism, have been modified and refined by
application of current business and financial methods and
techniques.
Congress, in contrast, has been hampered by custom,
tradition, and antiquated techniques. The following Chapter
discusses and describes the specific criticisms being leveled
at Congress. To provide an appreciation of the context from
which such criticisms arise, the Fiscal Year 1970 Department
of Defense Appropriations Act is observed as it made its way

57
through Congress, Criticisms and reform proposals are
analyzed as they apply to the processing of the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act,

CHAPTER IV
CRITICISMS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PHASE OF
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act
,
Fiscal Year, 1970
The Fiscal Year 1970 budget was submitted to Congress
by President Johnson on January 15s 1969» and recommended
appropriations and hew budget authority of $210.1 billion,
with |l43.9 billion requiring legislative action by Congress.
The remainder ($66.2 billion) would become due under existing
law without congressional action. This "carry-over" authority
is frequently criticized for its deleterious effect on
congressional control over Federal spending.
The President's budget estimated outlays for Fiscal
Year 1970 in the amount of &195.3 billion. This figure
included $0.9 billion in net lending. National defense
programs accounted for approximately $81.5 billion, or
k2 per cent, of the estimated outlays and almost $83 billion
of the recommended budget authority for Fiscal Year 1970. <




As one of his first official acts, President
Nixon announced that his administration would substantially
reduce the overall size of the budget. Foremost among the
President's advisors, in the effort to reduce spending, was
the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin Laird,
The Defense Secretary had come to the Pentagon from his
long-time membership on the House Appropriations Committee
and the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations.
In late February. 1969* the President and the Defense
Secretary announced that the defense budget had been reduced
by over two billion dollars. Defense reductions were
described as being the results of "cutting costs" and
"economizing." Assurance was given that United States
defense posture would not be adversely effected, but rather,
that the defense forces would be put in fighting trim. The
Defense Secretary added his assurances that the announced
reductions would not deprive the armed forces in Vietnam
of needed materials or equipment in any way.
Delayed somewhat by this further, extended review
of the budget by the incoming Administration, Congress began
hearings in March, 1969. The Defense Subcommittee on
Appropriations began its hearings on March 11, 19o9 with




personnel.^ The House Armed Services Committee began its
hearings on March 27, 1969.
Another frequent criticism of the Congress involves
this multiple hearings process. Senior civilian and military
officials of the armed services and the Department of Defense
are simultaneously in demand by each of the congressional
committees. The task of scheduling the appearances of the
Secretary of Defense, the various Service Secretaries, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior
civilian and military officials is a monumental one.
Scheduling is further complicated when the Senate committees
begin their hearings at the same time. Usually the Senate
hearings will follow the House hearings , but this is not
always the case. The Senate often holds joint hearings
between its Appropriations and Armed Services Committees on
the defense authorization and appropriations bills, and this
greatly simplifies the scheduling of witnesses.
The Senate Armed Services Committee issued its
report on the Defense Authorization Bill on July 3» 19&9 ~
three days after the start of the 1970 fiscal year. The
House Armed Services Committee completed its hearings on
2 8{j, s. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Def ense Appropriations for 1970 > Hearings
,
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, on H.R. 15090, 91st Cong., 1st
sess., 1969, Part 1, p. 1.
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August 8 8 1969p The delays encountered in the authorization
process are frequently responsible for subsequent delays
and lateness in the enactment of appropriations. It is
during the authorization process that opposing political
forces are able to exert the greatest impact on the time-
liness of the btidget cycle e
Congressman Mendal Rivers (D e South Carolina)
,
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, informally
advised legislative circles that his bill would not be
reported to the floor until the Senate had passed the Defense
Authorization Bill.
x
This measure contained the highly
controversial Safeguard (ABM) missile deployment program.
Congressman Rivers , a vocal advocate and supporter of the
armed forces and a strong defense posture, did not want to
stand alone on the Safeguard (ABM) issue , There had been
heavy opposition to the ABM deployment program, both in and
out of Congress. A great deal of publicity, favorable and
adverse, had been released by various interest groups and
news media. Congressman Rivers wanted the Senate to take
a position one way or the other on the Safeguard program.
The Senate subsequently passed the Defense
Authorization Bill (S . 25^6) on September 18, 1969. The
bill provoked thirty-three days of stormy debate and several
amendments were added on the floor in the Senate. The
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unlimited debate rules prevailing in the Senate are often
criticized for delaying legislative action. In this instance,
debate was for the most part germane and relevant to the
legislation being considered. This is not always the case.
Relevancy is not an essential requirement in the upper
House.
The House Armed Services Committee reported out
its bill f on September 26 , 1969* With limited debate rules
prevailing in the House, the Defense Authorization Act was
taken up on October 1, and passed on October 3. The measure
(H.R. 1*4-000) was approved in the House with only three
amendments. AID. of the amendments which had been added in
the Senate were offered, considered and voted down by the
House.
Chairman Rivers, the Armed Services Committee, and
the House of Representatives were harshly criticized for the
hasty passage of the Authorization Act. The House was accused
of stiffling debate. One highly incensed periodical called
the session "a travesty," and charged in an editorial that
copies of the printed hearings were not made available to
the membership until three days before floor debate. The
Committee Report was not delivered to the House until two
days before floor action. °




After passage of the Defense Authorization Act
by the House, the Senate and House versions were sent to
Conference Committee to reconcile differences. The Conference
Committee reached agreement in three weeks (with House views
generally prevailing). The bill was sent to the President
on November 6, 1969, and was signed on November 19, 1969»
Meanwhile, Congressman George H, Mahon (D, Texas),
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and Chairman
of the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, had earlier
stated that his committee would not report the Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1970 until such time as
the substantive committees had resolved the controversial
"authorization" measure . In his Committee Report, Chairman
Mahon provided the following explanation for the delay in
bringing the bill to the floor*
It was necessary that the (Appropriations) Committee
hear the Secretary of Defense following Congressional
clearance of the authorization in order that the
Committee might determine precisely the position of
the Administration, including its allocation of
priorities, with respect to the programs affected
by the authorization. 30
Finally, on December 8, 1969, over five months after
the start of the 1970 fiscal year, the House began consideration
of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1970
(H.R. 15090). The bill was debated on the floor of the
30u. S, Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations
Report to Accompany the Department of Defense Anpropriat ions




House for most of the afternoon, on December 8. Debate was
limited to three hours, with the usual five minutes allotted
for offering amendments. Several amendments were offered
during the afternoon. Only one of these amendments passed,
however, and it received a favorable endorsement from the
powerful Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, The
successful amendment was offered by Congressman Henry S.
Reuss (D, Wisconsin), and provided that:
• • • no part of any appropriation contained in this
act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes
not authorized by Congress. 31
This amendment was,, no doubt, influenced by the extended
discussion in the Senate by Senator J. W. Fulbright (D.
Arkansas) on December 1, 1969» .Occupying thirteen pages in
the Congressional Record , Senator Fulbright delivered a
scathing speech in which he decried all sorts of questionable
public relations activities conducted in the armed services
and the Department of Defense. Disclosed by Senator Fulbright,
in the Congres sional Record , were alleged expenditures for
public relations activities of $28 million per year by the
Defense Department and $10 million per year by the Navy. 3-
31u. S. Congress, House, Congressman Reuss speaking
for the Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1970, H.R. 15090, 91st Cong., 1st sess., December
8, 1969, Congressional Record, CXV, H 1190^-H 11905.
32u. S Congress, Senate, Senator Fulbright speaking
on Expenditures for Public Relations Activities by the Depart-
ment of Defense, 91st Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 1969i
Conp;re s s i onal Re cord , CXV, S 151^~S 15157.
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Another amendment offered by a Congressman from
New York suggested that the Defense Appropriations Act be
reduced 10 per cent across the board. Congressman Robert L.
F. Sikes (D. Florida), a Defense Subcommittee member,
responded to the amendment by stating forcefully that the
Subcommittee had worked very hard for some eight months in
effecting a $5 billion reduction. Congressman Sikes
pointedly informed the Congressman from New York that the
amendment he had just offered "would have the effect of
reducing the Defense Appropriations bill by over $1 billion
dollars for each minute that the gentleman had held the
floor." The amendment, when put to a vote, received no
serious support and was not carried. Ultimately, the
Defense Appropriations Act was passed by a roll-call vote
of 330 to 33.
The Senate Appropriations Committee completed its
consideration of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1970 the following week. Extensive debating ensued
in the Senate, first within the Appropriations Committee and
then on the floor. The Safeguard (ABM) missile controversy
was re-opened in all its fury. This subject had occupied
the Senate for three months earlier in the session, when
the Defense Authorization bill was being debated. With
unlimited debate rules prevailing, Senate discussions
quickly expanded to include such matters as United States
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foreign policy, the involvement of United States troops in
Southeast Asia, and a multitude of other defense policy
questions. It is relatively safe to suggest that only the
impending Christmas adjournment, and a Presidential threat
to call a special session of Congress if all money bills
were not acted upon, finally forced curtailment of debate.
The Defense Appropriations Act was passed by the Senate
and, again, many amendments were added on the floor. The
two versions, passed by the House and the Senate, were
referred to Conference Committee to reconcile differences.
Rushing into the Christmas holidays, the Conference
Committee quickly reached agreement on a compromise bill.
Again the House version generally prevailed. Critics complain
that the Conference Committee approach invariably results in
a sub-optimal decision. Compromise and consensus, by
definition, are usually facilitated by searching for the
lowest common denominator solution. Also, critics maintain
that the members of the Conference Committee exercise
extraordinary powers, and that constituency representation
is not equal on such committees. Once the Conference
Committee reports out a compromise solution, the two Houses
cannot offer amendments. The bill becomes a "take it or
leave it" situation. Acceptance and passage usually follows
quickly.
The Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
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1970 was submitted to the President for signature in late
December, 1969 , over eleven months after the original
submission of the budget to Congress. In the interim,
Congress found it necessary to enact two "continuing
resolutions," in order to enable the continuous operation
of the Department of Defense. "Continuing resolutions"
enable the executive departments and agencies to continue
operations at previously authorized levels. New programs
or expanded activities must await new funding authority.
The delays associated with passing appropriations
legislation hamper fiscal planning on the part of the
Executive. Coming late in December, and five months into
the applicable fiscal year, the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act was the latest congressional action on
a defense appropriation in modern memory • However, it was
not a record for tardy action. The Health, Education and
Welfare Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 19?0 was not
passed by Congress until January? 1970. This bill was
subsequently vetoed by President Nixon as being inflationary.
The Department of Health, Educatioii and Welfare finally
received its appropriation in March, 1970, over eight months
after the start of its fiscal year.
Chairman Mahon, in reporting the Appropriations
bill to the floor, highly commended Secretary of Defense Laird
for his assistance in making reductions in the defense budget
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of some $5 billion,, Secretary Laird and the Nixon Admin-
istration were commended for their actions which had resulted
in a $2 billion reduction in defense money. The rapport
and mutual respect, very much in evidence during these
proceedings , was noticeably changed from that which had
existed between the Congress and Secretary Laird's predecessor,
Mr, KcNamara,
However, the printer's ink had hardly dried on the
Defense Appropriations Act before the press began to report
conflicting views on the matter of defense reductions and
how they were achieved. Writing in The Washington Post,
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak offered the following
explanation:
Employing a sleight-of-hand learned in years of
congressional budget-cutting, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Robert Laird wrought a minor political miracle
in steering President Nixon's defense bill through
a Congress so hostile to the military that last
summer it was threatening irreparable budget cuts.
Laird's technique, carefully plotted with a handful
of key congressional defense experts, was to arrange
a budget scenario far in advance with this outcome:
Congress, not the Nixon administration, would get
the political credit for a whopping §5*5 billion
cut in appropriations for the present fiscal year
(ending June 30)
The technique allegedly used by Secretary Laird
involved the intentional omission of submitting formal
budget amendments to Congress, Normal budgetary procedure
33Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Defense Budget-
Cutting Miracle Due to Laird's Sleight of Hand," The
Washington Post, December 31, 1969* p. All,
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would have resulted in the submission of amendments revising
the estimates downward as programs and activities were
reviewed and curtailed or deleted. In lieu thereof, Secretary
Laird was accused of substituting private and frequent
consultations with congressional leaders on the Senate and
House Appropriations and Defense Committees, With these
congressional leaders, Secretary Laird allegedly discussed
reductions which would not adversely effect defense posture
and which could be "lived with," The desired result was to
give Congress credit for its economy efforts and the associated
all-important political credit and news media exposure as
"defense budget cutters "
Less than a week later, and again in The Washington
Post, Walter R. Mears of the Associated Press reported that
both Democrats and Republicans had laid claim to the economy
label and had simultaneously refuted the claim of each other.
Mr. Hears* article said:
The Senate Democratic Policy Committee said Congress
slashed President Nixon's budget and at the same time
realigned national priorities. The Senate Republican
Leader, Hugh Scott, rejected the Democrats' claim and
gave the Nixon administration credit for the reductions.
A Republican paper prepared by aides of Senator Scott
and the Bureau of the Budget claimed that "since taking
office, President Nixon has ordered $7.5 billion in
budget cuts for Fiscal Year 1970. Four billion was
trimmed from the original Johnson budget in April. In
f
July, the President ordered another cut of $3»5 billion" .3^
^Walter R. Mears, "GOP Disputes Democrats on Credit
for Budget Cuts," The Washington Post, January 5» 1970, p. A6.
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Regardless of the branch or element to ultimately
receive credit for the budget cuts, the fact remains that
the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1970 was
reduced by some i?5o5 billion during the time that it made
its perilous way through Congress. Critics of the
congressional phase of the budgetary process often question
the wisdom and rationale the Appropriations Committees use
in such budget cuts The following exchange, between Chairman
Mahon and General Earle G. Wheeler p USA, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is revealing on the matter of discretion
in reductions effected by the committee:
General Wheelers I would like to assure the committee
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have participated
fully in the examination of the reductions that
have been made in the budget.
Chairman Mahon: That have been made and that have been
proposed?
General Wheelers Yes, sir. We have. It is our belief
that the reductions have been made, as the Secretary
said a moment ago, in such a way as to have the
least possible adverse effect on our security.
Chairman Mahon: General Wheeler, do you say that under
all the circumstances, fiscal and otherwise, you
feel the proposed reductions are reasonably
acceptable and are you in support of them?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are.
I would like to say further that, of course, any
force structure that is prepared with fiscal
constraints obviously is not going to provide the
forces and the posture to meet every possible
contingency. However, we have provided in here for
the continuance of the war in Vietnam in such a
way as to support our forces effectively and permit
them to carry out their mission. We have struck
a balance, I think, between the needs of the present
and the needs for the future. In other words, we
have tried to maintain forces to protect our security
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today. At the same time, vie have supported programs
that will provide for our security 5 or 10 years in
the future,, I would like to conclude by saying
this f sir $ The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that
these reductions in this budget really represent
the limits of what we would call prudent risk.
Chairman Mahon: Thank you, General. 35
The Appropriations hearings covered a period of over
eight months „ The hearings involved literally hundreds of
witnesses and thousands of pages of testimony. Subject
matter on any given day and for any given witness ranged
from a broad discussion of overall defense policy to the
detailed minutiae of defense programs and activities. A
review of the seven. volumes of printed hearings held by the
House Appropriations Committee's Defense Subcommittee quickly
reveals substantial technical knowledge and professional
ability on the part of subcommittee members. Questions were
searching, relevant and based on broad experience and know-
ledge of the weapons systems, programs and activities being
reviewed and discussed.
The long hours of painstaking preparation required
of each witness come to fruition when he is confronted with
such detailed questioning concerning the activities and
accomplishments of his department or agency. The hearings
35u. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense .Appropriations for 1970 > Hearings
,
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives , on H.R. 15090, 91st Cong., 1st
sess., 1969, Part ?, u c 381.
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process can be extremely uncomfortable and unpleasant for
the ill-prepared or uninformed witness. Small wonder that
the function of preparing executive department and agency
witnesses for appearances before congressional hearings has
become a highly specialized profession. Those individuals
who achieve competence and agency confidence in this role
are highly regarded. Such individuals become extremely
valuable to their departments and agencies for their abilities
and expertise in anticipating committee interests and
expectations.
A well-prepared and well-briefed witness can do much
to enhance his agency's reputation and standing with the
committee. The House Appropriations Committee member, for
example, enjoys the respect and admiration of other congress-
men for his performance of hard work and expertise in his
particular speciality. Accordingly, the Committee member
recognizes and respects these superior qualities in the
departmental and agency witnesses who appear before them.
Generally, the hearings will conclude with compliments
and congratulations all around the table. However, few
hearings have ended with such lavish praise as the Defense
Appropriations hearings this past year. The following
exchange of complements ocourred:
Chairman Mahon: Mr. Secretary, it has been most helpful
to have been able to spend the day with you. Your
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testimony has been most helpful to us. You under-
stand our problem in a very special and peculiar-
way because of your former long and effective
service on the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations.
So we are most happy to have had you here. We have
not meant to harass you, vie do not think that we
have,. You have been most helpful to us. We want
to command you for your herculean efforts in the
field of defense and for your efforts toward
securing a just and honorable peace. We are really
grateful to you. We wish you good luck in your work.
We want you to know we are always anxious to cooperate
with you.
Secretary Laird: Thank you.
Congressman Flood: We could have sold tickets to fill
this stadium to hear this performance today.
Chairman Mahon: I want to say, General Wheeler, that yon
are an old friend of the committee. You have always
been most helpful to us and we appreciate your
appearance here. I have assumed that, generally,
you. and the Secretary work as a team and that what
he has said v in a general way and what you have said
in a general way represents the joint views of you
two gentlemen who occupy the highest jobs in the
Department of Defense.
General Wheeler: Your assumption is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Mahon: Vie are very pleased to have you. We are
very pleased to have Mr. Moot here also. He has done
a tremendous job in seeking to be of service to us.
Jack Stempler has been most helpful to us. Your
other aides and assistants also have been helpful.
1 wouldn't want to overlook Mr. Doug Sinclair, who
has been with us throughout the hearings this year.
When he leaves the committee room in a hurry, I
know what he is doing, he is dashing to the telephone
in order to call the Pentagon to get certain infor-
mation which he knows the committee needs. He has
been most helpful, Mr. Secretary, I want you to
know that.
Congressman Andrews : Mr. Secretary, Doug is an updated
General Moore to us
.
Secretary Laird: I thank you, Mr. Chairman. He works very
closely with Mr. Moot. I have great confidence in
Bob Moot, This has been a difficult year for the
Comptroller in the Department of Defense, probably
the most difficult year that any Comptroller has
had to face because of the uncertainties about every-
thing. He has done a very fine job and has been of
great support to me.
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Chairman Mahon: Mr. Secretary, it has been a most
difficult year to be Secretary of Defense, too,
as we well recognize. I am glad you have been
able to bear up under the responsibilities. We
wish you good health and success. Thank you very
much.
Congressmen Floods The consensus on this corner of the
table is that the mutual admiration society is
now adjourned. 3o
This concludes a brief synopsis of congressional
activity in processing the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1970. Significant items concerning the
DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1970 were also included
since "authorization" must precede "appropriation" measures
to the floor. A special rule may be obtained waiving points
of order to enable the appropriations measure to be considered
first. However, this is a very- rare and unusual event.
Authorizations will normally precede appropriations measures
to the floor in both the House and the Senate.
In the following section, some additional criticisms
of the congressional budgetary process are considered.
Criticisms of the Budgetary Process
In a classic document prepared for the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress, George Galloway
summarized and described the procedures used by the executive
agencies and departments in formulating the budget, the
36 ibid., p. ^75<
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various budget formats which have been used since 1921, the
congressional procedures for authorizing and appropriating
funds, and finally, the execution and audit of the budget.
Galloway listed many criticisms of executive and congressional
procedures and methods, and past congressional attempts at
reform. In introducing his work, Galloway provided the
following summary of criticisms of Congress:
Critics of the legislative phase of the budget process
have found fault with the piecemeal nature of the
appropriations process, the necessity for multiple
justifications of executive programs, the extreme
specification of appropriations, the making of
permanent and indefinite appropriations, incomplete
(inadequate) staffing of appropriations committees,
the holding of secret hearings by the House Appropri-
ations Conrnittee, the recurring end-of-the-session
log jams of supply bills which is attributed to the
double nature of the appropriations process , and the
failure to enforce a ceiling on appropriations. 37
This appraisal was written in April, 1950 - twenty
years ago c The same criticisms continue to appear in the
literature and news media today. As noted previously, there
have been no significant changes in the congressional phase
of budget review since the passage of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19^-6. The major reform provisions of
that Act have been largely ignored (the Legislative Budget)
and/or rendered ineffective by subsequent actions of the
37George B. Galloway, Reform of the Federal Budget ,
(mimeo), (Washington, D. C. : The Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service, Public Affairs Bulletin No,
80), April, 1950, P. ii.
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Congress (the proliferation of subcommittees following the
re-establishment of a single appropriations committee in
each body)
,
A summary of criticisms of the budgetary review
process follows:
1. Congress neither considers Federal expenditures in
relation to revenues nor the resulting impact on the national
economy.
2 C Many appropriations and revenue bills are received,
considered and enacted separately and completely independent
of each other, (Note: The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1970 was the nineteenth appropriations measure to be
acted upon by the 91st Congress)
3, Responsibility for reviewing and approving the Federal
budget is distributed (fragmented) among several subcommittees
in each body of Congress, The subcommittees are autonomous
and highly independent of the parent committee/body and of
the other subcommittees , especially in the House,
^l-. Legislative (substantive) committees do not exert
proper control over new programs and activities. These
committees often authorize new programs and commit the govern-
ment to future expenditures without adequately considering
the total cost or duration of the commitment,
5, Appropriations subcommittees give too much attention
to details and end-items of expenditure and not enough

11
attention to overall governmental policies, programs, and
objectives
.
6, The budget cycle is toe long. The length of the
budget cycle necessitates Executive Branch action to submit
many revisions, amendments and supplementals to the original
budget requests as changes in conditions and circumstances
occur,
7* Congress has been ineffective in promoting economy
and efficiency in Federal spending utilizing present tech-
niques e
8. Current congressional methods enable and encourage
local interests and pressure groups to exert undue influence
on the members of the substantive committees and appropriations
committees
9* The large "carry-over" of spending authority, resulting
from multi-year or indefinite appropriations and/or authori-
zations weakens congressional control and oversight over the
Executive e
10 o "Back-door" spending authority, resulting from
permanent authorization of specific funds by the substantive
committees, omits the particular agency from the annual
appropriations review. This further weakens congressional
control and precludes a review of the budget as a whole.
11, The appropriations acts are prepared in too much detail
and are too restrictive. The acts contain such a large degree
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of instructions, limitations and specification that the
executive departments and agencies are unable to perform
their functions properly. The great detail and specification
prevent Congress from holding the Executive responsible for
performance and results,,
12. The perennial supplemental and deficiency appropriations
which are requested and granted further lessens the control
and effective administration of the budget by Congress.
13. All committees, and specifically the appropriations
committees, have too few staff personnel. As a result, the
committees are unable to perform any substantial control or
surveillance over the gigantic and expanding Executive
Branch.
1^. Congress should establish better information flow
from and working relationships with the Bureau of the Budget.
15. Congress should increase its utilization of the
General Accounting Office in the budget review process.
The General Accounting Office can contribute to the budget
analysis phase as well as the audit phase.
Certain of these criticisms merit analysis in
greater depth* This analysis sets the stage for the subsequent
review of reform legislation now before the Congress,
Usually at the top of every list of criticisms of
the congressional budgetary process is the allegation that
Congress takes a piecemeal, fragmented look at the budget.
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A companion criticism is that Congress never considers the
President's financial plan as a whole. Congress does not
evaluate appropriations measures in relation to the current
estii of revenue. Congress, in its committee and sub-
committee structure, considers the budget as a series of
separate and unrelated parts. The House and Senate passed
over twenty separate appropriations bills during the First
Ses! ion of the 91st Congress, This count includes the various
supplementals , deficiencies and "continuing resolutions"
which were enacted. Appropriations and revenue bills are
consider.' and reported out by separate committees in the
House and Senate, Although these bills are ultimately voted
on and p 'j^ed by the entire Congress, there is little evidence-
that legislators give an}' consideration to the close inter-
relationships between the two types of bills.
The subcommittees assume responsibility for the
portions of the budget applicable to departmejits and agencies
under their particular jurisdictions, i,e os Defense Sub-
committee, HEW Subcommittee, Labor Subcommittee, etc. These
subcommittees give scant consideration to the accumulation
of total new obligational authority, total obligations to
be incurred or to the total level of expenditures or cash
outlays arising from other subcommittee action. In reaching
decision;, regarding the new obligational authority to be
granted, Congress does not establish the level of actual
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expenditures to "be made in the budget period* Neither are
benefits and costs in one bill compared to the benefits
and costs of other programs and activities in other bills.
In short, the Congress does not systematically consider the
President's budget as a whole nor does it consider the
relationship between the level of expenditures (cash outlays)
and estimated revenues.
In 1955* the Committee for Economic Development
recommended that a Joint Budget Policy Conference bo
established. This Conference was to have included members
of the congressional leadership, majority and minority
representatives from the appropriations and revenue committees
in both bodies, ©nd the Joint Economic Committee. The
Conference was to have been given responsibility for studying
the President's budget as a whole and reporting its findings
and recommendations. The Joint Conference Report was to have
provided communications between members of the revenue,
appropriations and Joint Economic Committees. This proposal,
however f suffered the fate of all similar proposals recommending
joint endeavors between the two Houses. It failed to generate
sufficient support for adoption. 3°
While no documentary evidence was found to refute
38David J. Ott and Attiat F.. Ott, Federal Budget




the criticisms concerning the piecemeal approach, congressional
budgetary review is not without a degree of overall coordination
and control. The organizational meeting of the full committee,
at the beginning of each cession, affords an opportunity for
presentations by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors and other witnesses on the state of the
economy and the expected impact of the budget. Also, the
Chairman and the ranking minority member participate in the
meetings of each subcommittee, thereby providing a degree of
continuity and control. It is In the subcommittee environment
that the splintered jurisdiction and fragmented, piecemeal
approaches are alleged to occur. The Chairman and the ranking-
minority member are able to provide a total view of the status
of the budget. The Chairman can also establish broad
objectives, goals or targets for the subcommittees.
The foregoing rationale notwithstanding, it is
imperative that the inter-relationships of Federal spending
plans and estimates of revenue be considered at some point
in the budget review process. Congress must appreciate and
be able to comprehend the combined effect of Federal spending
and revenues on the level of employment, price levels,
economic growth and the international balance of payments.
Congress has on occasion formulated taxing and/or spending
policies without any apparent consideration of the resultant
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effect on the national economy.
Congress' failure to promptly react to the
President's suggested fiscal policies has not always been
due to basic disagreement* Too often, the lack of timely
response has resulted primarily from the involved congressional
machinery. The slew legislative process and the resulting
delays in implementing remedial fiscal actions to stimulate
or retard the economy have been criticized by Ott and Oct:
In general, both tax and expenditure changes are
slow and somewhat clumsy instruments of policy, largely
because of the need to obtain legislation from Congress
for all significant policy changes .39
This appraisal of legislative tardiness and the
adverse effects on the timely initiation of fiscal policy
actions by the Executive Branch is supported by Joseph P c
Harris s
The difficulty of making opportune fiscal decisions
is further increased by the long lapse of time, due in
part to cumbersome legislative procedures, between the
preparation of plans and estimates and the eventual
expenditure. ^
The "new economics" guidelines require the government
to meet business recessions by promptly increasing Federal
spending and/or lowering taxes. This action is advised even
at the risk of incurring substantial deficits. This theory
39 lbid., p. 90.
Harris, Congressional Control, p. 66 .
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is based, on the ever-rising potential of the national economy.
Accordingly, the theory provides that any budget deficit,
incurred during a recession, will be recovered and reversed
by increased tax receipts when the economy begins to swing
up again. The primary frustration to application of "new
economics" theory is the long reaction time of the Legislative
Branch. Legislation proposed to increase taxes or to increase
(or decrease) expenditures, is subjected to careful scrutiny by
Congress. By the time such legislation is enacted, the economic
climate may have changed and the corrective action may now be
too harsh or too mild to have the desired effect. x
Few discussions of the congressional phase of Federal
budgeting fail to observe that the primary faults are not in
the appropriations process, but rather are in the authorization
process. Such faults include the allegation that the sub-
stantive committees do not exercise proper control over initial
authorization of new and/or expanded programs and activities.
It is most difficult to reduce or eliminate spending once it
has started and has gained the support of various local
interest and pressure groups. The most effective control that
Congress can exert occurs at the authorization stage and before
the new projects have been started.
**1 Federal Economic Policy, p. 7.

8^
As a result of these previously approved and
continuing programs, the portion of the budget subject to
congressional control each year is relatively small „ The
large welfare programs, veterans* programs and interest on
the national debt are, in the main, uncontrollable by Congress,
This large uncontrollable portion of the budget is the
"submerged part of the iceberg." Approximately *K) per cent
of the total Federal budget is not controllable on an annual
basis by Congress* Of the national security portion of the
budget (Defense, AEC, NASA), approximately 95 per cent is
controllable as a result of an annual budget review. In
contrast, only about 25 per cent of the domestic programs
(Welfare, Veterans, Pensions, etc.) are controllable by an
annual budget review. ^2
Writing of the efficacy of controls at the authori-
zation stage, Murray Weidenbaum provides the following
comments
:
Proposed legislation represents that stage of the
overall Federal government spending process which is
most amendable to direct and effective control. At
the outset, the President can refrain from making these
new recommendations, or he may modify proposals of
administrative agencies to his liking. The Congress
can refuse to vote enabling legislation, or modify
proposals as its collective judgment dictates. Finally,
the President can veto any such legislation that is
^^siesinger, Business, Government, p. 221,
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passed by the Congress.^3
In the past, substantive committees have been
criticized for enacting "permanent" authorizations. Programs
and activities enjoying such authorization are not subject
to annual review and approval by Congress. The only annual
review of such programs and activities is performed by the
appropriations committees. In recent years, the House has
increased the number of programs and activities subject to
annua?, authorization. The obvious intent is to reduce the
degree of dependence of the general membership on the House
Appropriations Committee. Annual authorization provides a
means for direct inquiry via the hearings process for the
substantive committees and the executive departments and
agencies.
The Constitution provides for the military establish-
ment. Therefore , annual authorization by a substantive
committee would normally not be required prior to action on
appropriations legislation. The Congress has, however, voted
to require annual authorization on certain military programs.
For example, in 1959* the House extended the annual authori-
zation process to all expenditures for "aircraft, missiles and
naval vessels." The enabling legislation, as subsequently
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Federal Budgeting - The
Choice of Government Programs," Congres s and the Federal Budget,
(Washington, D. C. : American Enterprise institute for Public
Policy Research, 1965) » PP. 56-57.
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A major criticism of the budgetary process is that
the budget cycle is too long. The Executive Branch or.
its budget formulation approximately sixteen months prior to
the start of the applicable f 1 '• Lividua]
agencies and departments usually begin preparatory work on
their budget submissions even earlier. The budgeting procei
requires such a long time primarily bee- of co ision I
^Raymond Dawson, "Congressional Innovatio
Intervention in Defense Policyi Le ; blve / ton of




insistence upon detailed, item-by-item review. The Executive
phase is correspondingly longer because of the elaborate
preparations required to enable witnesses to support and
defend their requests for funds . The Executive Branch spends
much of its preparation time constructing "justification
books" to support the line item review demanded by the
appropriations subcommittees
.
A shorter budget cycle would enable the Executive to
submit more accurate estimates. A shorter cycle would enable
planners and estimators to incorporate more current data in
their submissions, thereby reducing or eliminating the
necessity for amendments, revisions, supplementals , and
deficiency appropriations. The -shorter cycle would permit
more accurate forecasts of economic trends.
The six-month time span for congressional review of
the budget, immediately prior to the start of the fiscal year,
has proven to be totally unrealistic. Long term budgeting,
such as biennial or multi-year, would reduce the annual
workload of the Executive and Legislative Branches, Biennial
or multi-year budgets have been suggested for large capital
investment projects, such as public works construction. In
addition to spreading the workload over a longer period, the
expanded budget cycle would permit closer scrutiny of individual
projects. Congress would be better able to consider total
costs and benefits. Writing on the inadequacy of one-year
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budgets 9 and the failure to recognize total long term costs,
W. Z c Hirsch concludes:
• . . because of its one-year time span, the budget
overlooks the full cost implications of first-year
financing and has thus facilitated "foot-in~the~door"
financing that has often proved costly to the nation . ^5
Another criticism is as old as Congress itself.
Beginning with Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton, the Executive
Branch expressed a strong preference for "appropriations to
be granted under a few generalized heads." Congress preferred
detail and specification in the appropriations acts to insure
control and accountability. The House has historically and
adamantly objected to broad grants of authority for the
Executive Many factors are involved in ultimately determining
the degree of authority to be granted in the appropriations
actSe A partial listing of such factors would include:
1. The state of relations between the Executive and Congress.
These relations do vary over time. Degree of variance may
reflect the political affiliation of the resident at the White
House
2* The policies and procedures of the particular committee
or subcommittee handling the legislation.
3. The rapport and mutual esteem between the spending
agency and the committee. For example, the Federal Bureau of
^5W. Z e Hirsch, Integrating View of Federal Program
Budgeting
,
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, l9o~5), P» 2.
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Investigation has enjoyed an enviable and preeminent position
with Congress for many years. This is a tribute to the
Director, Mr. Hoover, and his extraordinary reputation with
Congress
,
b. The current state of technology in the field and the
capacity of individual members of the committee to assimilate
adequate knowledge about the field. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) enjoyed an abnormally large
degree of authority and freedom until such time as certain
congressmen began to develop a reasonably proficient compre-
hension of space technology and the language of space
scientists.
However, in the broader view, Congress has been
reluctant to grant any more authority to the Executive than
absolutely necessary. Appropriations bills have normally
been enacted in great detail and specificity and clearly
limitirjg or restricting the authorized goals, objectives and
policies* As previously mentioned, this itemization and
specification tends to hamper effective administration within
the Executive Branch. By enacting highly restrictive and
limiting legislation, Congress abrogates the Executive's
responsibility for satisfactory performance and successful
accomplishment of his assigned mission. Congress is somewhat
unique in this zealous approach to positive and complete
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control over the Executive departments and agencies. Joseph
Harris discusses this point, as follows:
In all democratic countries, the power of the purse
is the cornerstone of legislative control of adminis-
tration. The Congress of the United States , however,
far outdoes the legislatures of other democracies in
subjecting executive budgets to detailed, strict re-
view and extensive revision and in relating financial
control continuously and pervasively to the policies,
programs, and activities of executive agencies, ^
Prior to 196l, the Defense budget identified
appropriations by object classes and resource categories.
For example: the budget contained headings for Military
Personnel, Operation and Maintenance, Procurement, Research
and Development/Test and Evaluation, and Military Construction.
The budget identified the elements of input required and
made no reference to the specific goals, objectives or
programs involved,, The House Appropriations Committee, through
its subcommittees, determined the size and content of the
Defense budget based on testimony, substantiation and
justification presented, during the hearings. Members of
Congress could form their individual opinions on pending
legislation based on the printed hearings and recorded
testimony of witnesses. Since appropriations requests were
non-programmatic and did not involve policy questions, the
Appropriations Committee could evaluate them on strictly a
^Harris, Congressional Control, p. ^-6.
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"dollars and cents'* basis. Under the banner of "guardians
of the Treasury" and the battle cry of economy and efficiency,
the Appropriations Committee was able to reduce appropriations
without becoming involved in the politics associated with any
particular program. The Committee did not have to take a
position with regard to any specific governmental spending
policy. Richard Fenno discusses this point, as follows:
Committee objections, to program-oriented budgetary
forms, have rested in part on its preference for a
budget in which personnel items, travel items, equip-
ment items, etc., are separated out conveniently for
its scrutiny. It has considered these object classi-
fications easier to comprehend (and easier to cut)
than performance . budgets # **7
As an alternative approach to a detailed item-by-
item review, it has been recommended that Congress monitor
government policies and. programs at the broadest level. The
following quotation offers a suggestion for the re-directing
of congressional emphasis in the matter of control:
The committees might do well, then, to change their
policy targets from the budget to the climate of opinion
that shaped it. The influence Congress exercises on the
budget cannot be gauged solely by reference to committee
recommendations or floor debates and votes. Far more
consequential is the influence Congressmen exercise by
virtue of their contribution to the general climate of
opinion regarding desirable and possible defense expendi-
tures. This climate heavily conditions Executive and
Congressional choices alike. The relevance of the point
for the committee's approach to the budget is that it
is today's hearings, which contribute to tomorrow's
^7penno, The Power of the Purse, p. 336,
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climate of opinion. ^®
The "secret" hearings held by the House Appropriations
Committee are often criticized. The daily schedule of
congressional activity will invariably show that all of
the appropriations subcommittees are in closed sessions.
Witnesses are allowed only during the time of their particular
testimony, then they are usually excused by the Chairman.
The Senate, of course, holds open hearings on the
appropriations bills P Mark-up of the bills is accomplished
in executive "closed" session in both bodies. During these
executive sessions, only members of the committee and the
professional staff are allowed to be present* The hard
decisions are debated and decided during these mark-up
sessions. Thereafter, the committee report is prepared and
submitted to the full committee, and then to the floor.
If open hearings were held by the House Appropriations
Committee, communication among the members of Congress would
be improved. Also, by having competing programs presented,
the committee-s could sharpen their judgment and evaluation,,
Arthur Smithies has offered the following innovative approach:
Recognition of the role of choice among alternatives
should have an important bearing on government organi-
zation and procedures. I conceive of effective govern-
ment decision-making as consisting of adversary processes,
^8v;alter R e Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn K.
Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, (New York:
Columbia"*Univers ity Press,' 1 962") , p~p . 2V8-&£%
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analogous to processes in the legal field. The proponents
of alternative courses of action should state their claims,
marshall their evidence, produce expert testimony, and
perhaps cross-examine the other side. Someone in authority
then has to make a choice. ^9
A great deal has been written in this paper about
the expertise and professionalism of the members on the
appropriations committees. The House Appropriations Committee
has earned its title, "guardian of the Treasury." However,
the overall effect of Congress on the budget has been to
increase rather than decrease spending. As earlier stated,
responsibilities for authorization and appropriation are
divided among many committees and subcommittees. Often
individual members will urge economy and efficiency in the
government in general, but will press vigorously for continued
and additional Federal expenditures of benefit to their
particular constituencies. There is no doubt that Congress
is under great public pressure to increase and expand certain
Federal programs, and Congress has often added funds to the
budget which have not been requested by the Presidents
Though actions of Congress resulting in reductions
in the budget will generally receive wide publicity, economy
and efficiency remain as secondary considerations to the
political factors involved in any particular decision.
^9Arthur Smithies, Government Decision-Mak ing and




Congress can make any changes that it wishes to the financial
proposals submitted by the President. Budget estimates may
be increased or decreased. Items can be rejected entirely
and/or new items can be added. Congress has the power to
attach restrictions and limitations to the wording of
appropriations acts, and individual members have the power
to introduce bills, or offer amendments to bills, for the
purpose of increasing Federal expenditures. Congress
advises the Executive as to what should be included in the
budget by enacting authorization legislation. The authori-
zations prescribe, often in great detail, the programs and
activities which the executive departments and agencies may
conduct.
If the budget is prepared in accordance with this
guidance, substantial changes should be unnecessary and
unwarranted. Joseph Harris speaks to this point, in Congres-
sional Control of Administration
:
After the budget has been prepared and revised under
the direction of the President, substantial revision
should ordinarily be unnecessary, especially if it has
been prepared, as is usually true, with close attention
to legislative policies. Changes made by Congress when
the budget is under consideration, it should be recognized,
are often dictated by a few influential members who
occupy key positions on the finance committees, and may
not necessarily reflect the considered judgment of the
assembly. The changes are often increases for the
benefit of particular groups or sections rather than
reductions in the interest of economy. -50




There are many pressures to increase Federal
spending, Private individuals and organized pressure groups
(lobbyists) believe that the special benefits of c in
programs and activities are superior to the alternative
benefits to be gained by eliminating or reducing the level
of Federal spending and allowing a tax reduction for the
general public e Murray VJeidenbaum writes that Congress is
unable to resist these pressures because of its inadequate
budget review procedures. Weidenbaum cites:
. c a lack on the part of Congress of effective budget
reviewing tools and mechanisms to assist it toward wise
decisions in the .determination of the amounts of piiblic
funds that should be expended and in the allocation of
these funds among the various government programs 51
The Constitution created a bicameral Congress, to
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, Just as
a tripartite division of power and authority exists between
the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches, so also
does a balance of power exist between the two bodies of
Congress. Bicameralism, chosen by the founding fathers for
its added protections for civil liberties, results in certain
inherent operational inefficiencies. The Senate and the
House conduct duplicate hearings, perform duplicate work and
pass duplicate legislation. Ultimately, it is necessary to
reconcile these duplicate efforts in a Conference Committee.
51vfeidenbaum > "Federal Budgeting," p. 2
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Critics of Congress complain about the degree of
duplication and assert that the resulting Conference Committee
procedure grants the Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen
and the appointed Members even more power and influence than
they normally have. Conference Committee reports are generally
accepted and the compromise measures are passed by the
respective bodies almost automatically.
Final decisions are usually consensus decisions,
Which the politics of the particular situation will dictate.
The consensus of the group, in the committee environment,
will often settle on a compromise solution, and this final
decision may not reflect the best judgment of the majority
of the members. In Congress, political considerations
invariably prevail over economic rationalization or
optimization, whenever conflicts arise.
Congressional decisions are usually based on
information, often partial, provided by the spending depart-
ments and s.gencies themselves. The Congress necessarily
relies on the Executive Branch for performing the advocates'
role in support of various programs and the development and
presentation of alternative choices. Congress often mistrusts
much of the information it receives, realizing that the data
comes from a biased source. Congressmen frequently complain
about a lack of information and often accuse the Executive
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Branch of withholding essential information from them.
In fairness, much of this information controversy
involves the type of data being requested by Congress. The
Executive Branch and the Hoover Commissions tried to convince
Congress that its oversight purposes could best be served by
considering broad policies and programs rather than the vast
amount of detail in the budget.
On the subject of information flow, or rather the
lack of flow, Congress is continuously criticized for its
poor utilization of the Bureau of the Budget and the General
Accounting Office. -During the congressional phase of the
budgetary process, BOB officials could provide authoritative
information regarding the President's budget decisions and
the supporting rationale used in reaching his decisions.
These representatives would have an objective and broader
view of government-wide practices and programs , and would be
able to advise Congress concerning departmental performance
criteria, workload statistics, and cost estimates. BOB
personnel could offer assistance to the Congress in investi-
gating reports of unsound administrative practices and provide
other helpful information required by the committees.
Congress is also criticized for not using the General
Accounting Office to a greater extent in the budgetary review
process. Due to GAO's vast experience in Executive Branch
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operations, qualified GAO representatives could assist Congress
in evaluating budget request:;. As an arm of the Congress,
G/.O is not bound by Executive constraints or organizational
ties.
Some of the preceding criticisms arise simply
because the originator has failed to comprehend the nature
of politics and the political process. The congressional
phase of Federal budgeting is, after all, primarily political,
Members of Congress are politicians, not economists or systems
analysts. They live and work and achieve success in a
political world. It is their nature to seek compromise and
consensus. A sub-opti tl solution which helps everyone a
little is preferable to an optimum solution which may result-
in adverse political repercussions. Economic rationality and
optimum decision analysis do not always coincide with the
realities of politica.l life. In concluding this section,
an appraisal of the political process vis a vis the systems
analysis approach to problem solving is most relevant. In
his pamphlet, Systems Analysis and the Political Process,
James R. Schlesinger has described the dichotomy between the
two approaches to decision-making;
Systems analysis applies to substantive issues
susceptible to definition, where linkages exist among
costs, technologies, and closely related payoffs. The
criterion is some substantive (and presumably measurable)
utility which is more or less directly relevant to the
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enhancing of national security or citizen well-being.
'.. ie pride of systems analysis is its ability to take
a long rim view and to disregard prior < Ltments,
if they are too costly or non-productive. By contrast,
in politics one is concerned with more than the sub-
stantive costs and benefits involved in a specific
decision area. One is engaged in mobilizing supp.
by words and by actions over a wide range of ill defined
issues. The ultimate criterion will remain the
psychological and voting responses of the general
electorate and of important pressure groups. Positive
responses in this realm are only irregularly
correlated with those actions preferred on the basis of
cost-benefit criteria. The focus of political action
tends to be short run. The wariness with which the
approaching election is watched is tempered only by
the precept that the half-life of the public's memory
is approximately three months. 52
The following Chapter discusses significant efforts
at reform which have been attempted to correct the
deficiencies described in this Chapter. Although past
efforts at congressional reform have been singularly un-
successful, the attempts at solving certain problems provide
confirmation that Congress does, in fact, recognize its
deficiencies. It remains to be seen whether Congress views
these deficiencies with sufficient alarm as to actually
result in the initiation of reform and/or reorganization
legislation*
52James R. Schlesinger, Systems Analysis and the




CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Reforms of 191 9-1921
This Chapter describes several of the more
significant attempts at reform by Congress, Some of these
efforts have been discussed, at lengthy earlier in this
reports, and will be mentioned only briefly here.
The first major budgetary reform was the enactment
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This Act has been
described in Chapter III. It is sufficient here to note
that this legislation indicated recognition and concern on
the part of Congress regarding inadequacies in the appropri-
ations/expenditures process. The Act of 1921 established
the national budget system and granted the President authority
and responsibility for submitting a unified Federal financial
plan. The Bureau of the Budget was established to assist
the President with the national budget system. The General
Accounting Office and the Comptroller General were established
as direct agents of Congress and as a counter-balance to the
Bureau of the Budget. In 1920, the House re-established a




achieve the d ed degree of coordination and control over
the appropriations process Almost immediately after re-
establishment of a single c btee, several subcommittees
were formed in order to enable the House to cope with the
greatly increasing workload <>
Reforms of 19^6
The next major effort at reform was the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19zJ-6 This Act has also been described
in Chapter III. The Legislative Budget was included among
the reforms enacted/by this Act. The Legislative Budget \.
an effort on the part of Congress to focus attention, for
the first time, on the Presidents budget as a whole. This
concept envisioned congressional consideration of the
President's total financial plan, including expenditures
and estimated revenues. A Joint Committee comprised of
members of the appropriations and revenues committees from
both Houses was expected to review the total budget, consider
both expenditures and estimated revenues, and establish
by concurrent resolution a fixed ceiling on appropriations.
The ceiling or maximum amount that could be appropriated was
to have been reported to Congress for approval by February
15 » of each year.
However, time limitations were too short to conduct
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a realistic review of the budget as a whole. Furthermore,
the Joint Committee was too large and unwieldy for effective
productivity. The Legislative Budget was first attempted
in 19^7, but the Joint Committee could not reach agreement
on a ceiling. In 19*1-8, the Joint Committee successfully
agreed on a ceiling, but the maximum was not enforced by
either body of Congress. The concept was never tried again.
Originally enacted as Section 138, of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19Al-6, the Legislative Budget is still
effective. The enabling section has never been repealed
or amended.
The Employment Act of 19^6 established the Joint
Committee on the Economic Report, which is now the Joinl
Economic Committee. This committee performs an educational
service for Congress and the public at-large. The Joint
Economic Committee holds public hearings during which
testimony is received from the several economic advisors
to the President and other economists in the public and
private sectors. As a result of these hearings, the total
financial plan and economic policies of the government are
placed in perspective. The Joint Economic Committee is not
included in the formal budgetary process and does not




The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 195.0
Another ill-fated attempt at budgetary : was
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1950, known as the
Omnibus Appropriations Act This was another effort on the
part of Congress to conduct a review of the President's
total financial plan. Rather than processing a number of
sep be appropriations bills throi h the various sub-
committees s all appropriations were consolidated into one
omnibus bill. With most congressional interest and pressure
for adoption coming from the Senate, the concept was put to
a test on a voluntary basis in 1950. The appropriations
being considered were applicable to Fiscal Year 1951. The
House Appropriations Committee did not like the idea and
subsequently voted to return to the traditional procedure
of processing individual appropriations bills. The omnibus
appropriations concept, rejected after one trial, had two
inherent disadvantages
:
1. Non-controversial measures were included together with
controversial ones. Appropriations legislation moved at
the pace of the slowest component. The Senate was unable to
commence action on any element until the House had completed
action on the entire package. As a result, the new procedure
was blamed for delaying the appropriations acts. This charge
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can be lessened, if not outright refuted,, The actual
legislative schedule of the omnibus measure from its intro-
duction to enactment is discussed hereafter,
2. The President was not granted power of the "item veto."
The Omnibus Appropriations Act was a potential catch-ail
for appropriations riders. The President was powerless to
veto any specific item without vetoing the entire appropri-
ations pa.ckage for the Federal government.
The second, of these disadvantages, is considered
to be valid. However, the allegation that the omnibus
appropriations concept was inherently slow merits further
investigation. The legislative schedule reveals that the
bill was processed with lightning-like speed as compared
to some Fiscal Year 1970 appropriations;
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1950 (FY 51
)
Legend
March 21 ... . House Appropriations Committee reported
out Omnibus bill
May 10 .... . House passed bill




. Senate passed bill. Three week Conference
Committee
September 6 . . President signed Omnibus Appropriations Act
The Fiscal Year 1950 budget was not signed by the
President until October 29, 19^9. Advocates of the omnibus
appropriations approach claimed that it required less time,
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promoted fuller and more informed debate and resulted in
budget reductions
„
Joint Committee on the Budget
Establishment of a Joint Committee on the Budget
was another reform proposal. Senator John L. McClellan
(D. Arkansas) introduced a bill in the 8lst Congress (1950)
proposing the creation of such a Committee, The Committee
would be comprised of fourteen members $ seven from each
appropriations committee. Representation would consist of
four majority members and three from the minority. Chairman-
ships would rotate between the House and Senate on alternate
years. The Senate has passed the measure in one form or
another almost every year since 195^o However, the House
has never allowed debate or vote on the proposal.
A Joint Committee on the Budget would enable Congress
to review the budget as a whole. Other provisions of the
bill would
:
1. establish a joint appropriations professional staff;
2. promote closer working relationships and cooperation
between appropriation committees;
3. enlarge the role of the General Accounting Office; and,
*f, improve coordination and communication between the
appropriations committees and substantive committees.
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Although considered by some to be a promising
proposal, the Joint Co imittee approach has not been embraced
by the House. Two typical evaluations of the House position,
regarding this particular reform, are:
An abortive effort was made, in 1952, to strengthen
Congressional control over Federal expenditures by
establishing a Joint Committee on the Budget, to
consist of 14 members drawn from the two Appropriations
Committees. Passed by the Senate and the House Rules
Committee, it was killed on the floor when the House
refused to take it up. Representative Cannon (D.
Missouri) had denounced the proposal as an invasion
of the constitutional prerogatives of the House to
initiate appropriations bills, 53
. , e the House of Representatives has consistently
withheld approval of Senate bills to create a Joint
Committee on the Budget, and no vote has been permitted
on the merits of the proposals. As a result of this
inaction, Members of Congress and the Appropriations
Committees continue to labor under a tremendous handi-
cap in passing judgment on budget reouests for the
Executive Branch of the government £ 5**
Representative John Taber (R, New York) voiced
House objections when he expressed concern over the possible
loss of initiative for appropriations measures and the loss
of power to a Joint Committee "who might not have the same




53Federal Economic Policy, p. 39.
5^u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government
,
S. Rept. 196l,~B7th Cong., 1st sess., 19oi, p. 197.




Senator Warren G« Magnus on (D, Washington) has
introduced legislation (S 4 2846 in the 85th Congress and
Sc I838 in the 86th Congress ), acknowledging the problems of
the present appropriations process in Congress. Senator
Magnuson would establish a separate Fiscal Session, when
only money bills could be considered, from November through
December 31 of each year. A Legislative Session would be
held from January through October 31 » unless Congress adjourned
earlier. This bill would also change the fiscal year to
coincide with the calendar year e The President would submit
his budget by July 15« The Senator expressed hope that this
reform would enable more members of Congress to become
better informed about the budget and its contents.
The bill would require a separate report of govern-
ment owned capital assets and the asset value, and a report
to the Secretary of the Treasury on the value of reimbursables
accrued by es.ch department and agency would be required.
Both of the proposed bills died in the Committee on the
Judiciary without action. The measure was again introduced
in the 91st Congress. The current form and content of the
proposal will be analyzed in the following Chapter.
The Budget as a Whol e
The Eisenhower Administration recommended a concept
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for improving the congressional budget review process.
Called the "Budget as a Whole," the concept was really very
simple. The recommendation was that Congress should continue
to process the budget in its usual, piecemeal fashion. The
various subcommittees would retain their final "mark-up"
and report of recommendations and, then, conduct a review
of the total budget after completion of all subcommittee
action. The House Appropriations Committee rejected this
idea summarily, and called it unrealistic and impractical.
The Administration was accused of failing to understand the
fundamentals of the budgetary process,, However, several
states reportedly used a budgetary system similar to th
suggested. The appropriations committees hold their individual
recommendations until such time as all units are ready to
report, then serious attention is directed to the total level
of expenditures in relation to estimated revenues. If
deficits are likely to occur, appropriations are further
reduced or methods must bo found to increase revenues.
A related proposal for keeping Congress informed
of the total amount of funds that have authorized was
suggested by Murray Weidenbaum, Called a Budgetary Score card,
the concept provides for maintaining a running balance of
money amounts included in appropriations and authorizations
as the measures are approved. The Budgetary Scorecard is:
, , , a procedural means of enabling congressional
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commltteos and subcommittees, and the Congress as a
whole, to focus at1 bion on the total "budget picture
as actions are taken on individual "bills appropriating
funds or creating new expenditure programs. 5°
Raving listed the several reforms and changes
attempted in the past, as well as those proposals which
have been suggested, but not tried, the following Chapter
turns to the description, analysis and evaluation of reform
legislation pending in the 91st Congress. Only legislation
introduced in the current session is considered active If
these measures are not acted upon by the time Congress
adjourns its 2nd session, the legislative process must be
re-initiated in the v'92nd Congress.
As stated earlier, Senator Magnuson has re-
introduced his proposal for Fiscal/Legislative Sessions.
It may not come as a great surprise that a proposed legis-
lative Reorganization Act has been favorably reported out
by the Committee on Government Operations in the Senate.
An identical measure is being considered by a Subcommittee
on Legislative Reorganization of the House Rules Committee.
These proposals are discussed and analyzed in Chapter VI.
56vje idenbaum, "Federal Budgeting," p. 89.

CHAPTER VI
REFORM LEGISLATION BEFORE THE 91st CONGRESS
The Fiscal Act of 1970
Senator Magnuson's proposal for separate legislative
and fiscal sessions is currently titled the Fiscal Act of
1970 (S. 3113) • In addition to providing a session of
Congress for legislation and a session for appropriations
bills, the measure also establishes the calendar year as the
governmental fiscal year. Mr. Magnus on , Mr. Baker, Mr. Byrd
of West Virginia, Mr. Dole, and Mr. 'Mansfield are listed as
co~sponsors of S„ 3113. The concept has been introduced by
Senator Magnuson several times in the past, but the bill has
never reached the floor for debate or vote. The Judiciary
Committee has been the graveyard in the past, but this session
the bill was referred to the Committee on Government Operations.
The proposal recommends that congressional sessions
would begin in January, and end on the first Monday in
November, and would be called Legislative Sessions. Congress
would reassemble on the second Monday in November for the
purpose of considering appropriations bills and resolutions.




Session, Only bills and resolutio: relating to appropriations
would be considered during Fiscal Sessions and, correspondingly,
only subst 1 1 ivc measures would be considered during
Legislative Sessions. The Fis&al Act of 19?0 provides for
the regular functioning of st "' co iti es during both
sessions. Thus, committees would be allowed, under the rules
prevailing in the two bodies, to hold hearings or perform
any other business under their particular jurisdictions.
There are, of course, the usual safeguards and exceptions for
national security matters. In the event of an emergency,
foreign or domestic,- the President could advise Congress that
expedited legislative action is warranted. Thereafter, the
emergency measure would be immediately considered by Congress.
The Committees on Appropriations in the House and
the Senate would be allowed to hold hearings during the
Legislative Sessions, but would not be able to report out
appropriations bills until the Fiscal Session, However, bills
and resolutions required to enact supplemental and deficiency
appropriations for the current fiscal year would be in order
for reporting during any Legislative Session.
Title II of the Act, provides that the fiscal year
of the Treasury of the United States , in all matters of
accounts, receipts, expenditures, estimates, and appropriations
would commence on January 1, 1973s and would end on December
31, 1973. The bill further provides for effecting the change
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in fiscal years by extending the fiscal year commencing on
July 1, 1971 to December 31, 1972. Thereafter, the govern-
ment's fiscal year would run from January 1, to the following
December 31. Appropriations for each fiscal year after
1973 would be enacted during the Fiscal Session immediately
preceding,.
Senator Magnuson proposes that the President submit
the budget on or before July 15* preceding the fiscal year.
An added provision in this bill requires that the
Executive include a statement in the budget showing the
capital assets of the Federal government and the capital
asset value as of the end of the last completed fiscal year.
Introduced in the 91st Congress, on November ^-,
1969* the bill was referred to the Committee on Rules and
Administration. On January 21, 1970, the Committee on Rules
and Administration discharged the bill and referred it to
the Committee on Government Operations. ^'
In January, 1970, a staff member of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations was interviewed concerning
the bill's status. He said that it was "hot," and that the
leadership in the Senate was strongly advocating congressional
reform,, He noted that the bill was "well sponsored" by
senior Senators. The bill, he thought, would get quick
57u. S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Act of 1970 (A
Bill), S e 3113, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, pp^ 1-9.
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consideration and approval in the Senate...
This optimism has proved to I. led. In mid-
March, the Government Operations Coi staff member
disclosed that the measure had been routed to the Executive
Branch for comments. The staff member further advised that
no committee action was currently soh u] d on the bill.
Congressman Louis C Wyman (E. New Hampshire)
expressed a number of objections to Senator Magnuson's
proposal during the former's testimony before the Subcommittee
on Legislative Reorganizatir :. in the House. Congressman
Wyman observed that by adopting the proposal, Congress would
commit itself to a full year schedule. Although recent
sessions of Congress have continued into December, the pro-
posed legislation would make November-December sessions a
matter of law. It is not believed that many congressmen
would be eager to accept a year-around schedule with such
finality,, and further, to pass a law thereby "setting it in
concrete." Congressman VJyman further noted the fact that on
alternate years some representatives who had not been re-
elected would be deciding and voting on appropriations
matters. Eventually, he predicted, there would surely be
appropriations "hold overs" extending beyond December 31
•
This would be especially true if other reforms in the
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congressional budgetary process were not accomplished. 58
The proposed time frames for the Legislative and
Fiscal Sessions would provide five and one-half months for
congressional review of the "budget. If the President submits
the budget on July 15* the Appropriations Committees would
have to compress their hearings schedule and "mark-up" into
three and one-half months (July 15-November 1). This does
not seem to be a very realistic proposition in view of recent
lengthy budget review proceedings.
In an interviews, Mr. Paul M. Wilson, Chief Clerk
and staff Director for the House Appropriations Committee,
questioned the rationale for delaying the submission of the
budget to Congress e Mr. Wilson doubted that Congress would
agree to waiting around the Hill, from January until July 15$
before it could get started on the President's financial
program. Mr, Wilson also questioned whether Congress was
ready to accept a full year schedule, and further, that it
would pass a binding law to that effect. 59
The Legislative Reorgani zation Act of 1969/1970
The major item of reform legislation now on the
58u, S. Congress, House, Committee on Rules,
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 ? Hearings, before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, P. 307.
59paul M. Wilson, Chief Clerk and Staff Director,
House Appropriations Committee, interview at the Capitol,
Washington, D. C. , March 13, 1970.
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calendar of the 91st Congress is the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1969. This bill (S. 844) was introduced by Senator
Karl E. Mundt (R. South Dakota), and had the following co-
sponsors: Senators Boggs , Case, }. In, Griffin, Metcalf,
Percy, Sparkman, and Stevens. Introduced on February k, 1969,
the measure was referred to the Committee on Government
Operations. Reported out of committee favorably and without
mt,, on May 23, 1969* it was placed on the Senate
calendar (No, 192) to await call to the floor by the leader-
ship. 60
In recommending that the bill pass, the following
legislative background was included in the Committee Report:
S„ 844 would be known as the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1969 and would implement most of the principal
recommendations contained in the final report of the
Joint Committee en the Organization of the Congress,
filed in the Senate in the 89th Congress (S. Rept. 3>1^).
With one major exception and certain minor revisions,
So 844 incorporates virtually all of the provisions of
S e 355 which passed the Senate by a rollcall vote of 75
to 9» on March 7, 196?, following 1? days of debate, 31
rollcall votes, and the adoption of 4-0 amendments. It
was referred to the House Committee on Rules which held
a hearing on April 10, 196?, and took no further action,,
The major exception referred to is the omission of
title V of S, 355 » dealing with the regulation of
lobbying; the minor revisions relate primarily to matters
which have been taken care of either administratively or
in other legislation, and technical and conforming,
amendments designed to update the earlier measure .°1
60u. S, Congress, Senate, Legislative Reorgani zation
Act of 1969 (A Rill) , S. 844, 91st Cong., 1st sess.", 196~9T~P. II.
6lu. S. Congress, Senate, Legislative Reorganizat ion
Act of 1969» S. Rept. 91-202 to Accompany S. 644, 91st Cong.,
1st sess",
, 196 9 1 P* 1.
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The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1969 (S. 8kk)
proposes a number of significant congressional changes, how-
ever, several of these are beyond the scope of this paper.
Many of the recommendations do not pertain to the congressional
phase of the Federal budgetary process. Specifically,
Title II, of the bill, pertains to Fiscal Controls. In
order to convey the sleeping nature of the bill and to provide
a degree of continuity for the several reform proposals, a
resume' of the measure's contents is provided.
In reporting the bill, the Committee cited the
following primary objectives and principal provisions:
... to improve and strengthen the organization and
operation of the Congress in order to enable it more
effectively to exercise its constitutional responsi-
bilities and cope with its ever-increasing workload.
It (S. 8^4) provides for: (l) modifications in
standing committee procedures relating to the powers
of committee chairmen, hearings, reporting of measures
,
proxy votes, and the exercise of more effective
legislative oversight by such committees; (2) the
establishment of more effective fiscal controls,
including new procedures for congressional review of
the Federal budget, increased utilization of the
General Accounting Office, and new fiscal responsi-
bilities in the legislative standing committees; (3)
expansion of, and improvements in, congressional
sources of information, including enlargement of
permanent professional staffs and Members' staffs, and
a reorganization of the Legislative Reference Service;
and, (^) improvements in internal organization and
administration relative to housekeeping activities,
including the establishment of a permanent Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations, an Office of
Placement and Management, a reorganized, professional
Capitol Police Force and Capital Guide Service, a man-
datory adjournment date, of July 31 t end a prohibition
of sessions in August, in the absence of a congress ionally
declared state of war, and appointments of postmasters
in the competitive civil service without Senate
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confirmation or any congressional intervention.
°
2
The Committee referred to the estimated total annual
cost of all of the recommended changes as being approximately
15 million. This estimate was originally reported by the
Senate Special Committer on Organization of the Congress in
connection with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967
(S. 355)c 6 3
The specific provisions of the Legislative. Re-
organization Act of 1969 (So 8*1*0, which are relevant to this
report, are those under Title II, Fiscal Controls. Title I,
deals with a number of changes in committee procedure,
hearings, reports, etc.,. but specifically excludes the
Appropriations Committees in the two bodies.
The background leading to S„ 8*1^, is both informative
and necessary to a full understanding of the Act e s present
status. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
(89th Congress, 2nd Session), in Report lM*-.L , found that:
1. the nation's growth and the increasing complexities of
our commitments a.t home and abroad, over the past twenty years,
had placed a heavy burden on the budgetary process for the
Executive and Legislative Branches;
2. since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Bureau
62 ibid., p. 2.
63U, S. Congress, Senate, Legislative Reorganization
Act of 196?, S. Rept. 1 to Accompany S. 355, 90th Cong., 1st
sess., 19o7» P. 2.
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of the Budget had presented a single budget document reflecting
appropriations for all executive departments and agencies?
3. the President had continued to incorporate improved
budgetary methods in order to make administration and control
more effective within the Executive Branch;
^•. these improved methods included program budgets and
the rational selection of alternatives based on output;
5e the Planning, Programming , and Budgeting System had
been adopted to define objectives and goals, to find adequate
measures of perfo:*. Lee toward these objectives and goals, and
to analyze the various alternatives with a view toward deter-
mining the comparative benefits and costs of each competing
program; and,
6. that these new concepts of cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit studies » In addition to their use in formulating the
budget, have also improved the quality of budget submissions.
The Committee (Monroney Committee) further found, as
reported by the Committee on Government Operations
:
• CO that: (1) the Constitution vests in the Congress the
absolute power to determine how much the government will
spend on each program and the total extent of Federal
spending; (2) Congress has not equipped itself to enable
it to exercise its fiscal responsibilities meaningfully
and effectively; (3) as a result, Congress conducts a
fragmented budget study and finds it difficult to make
a comprehensive, overall - evaluation; (4) the increase
of total Federal spending, the use of the executive
budget and the development of more sophisticated tech-
niques of budget analysis all make congressional control
of fiscal policy more difficult; and, (5) if Congress,
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which now shares its fiscal powers with the Executive
Branch, is to maintain effective control over Federal
spending, budgetary and fiscal data must be collected,




The Monroney Committee published 15 volumes of
testimony with related documents totalling 2,322 pages. The
Committee heard 199 witnesses, including 17 Senators and 59
Representatives Four Senators and 26 Representatives
submitted written statements for the record Congressional
witnesses represented a total of 997 years of service in
Congress .65
As a result of these hearings, the Committee con-
cluded that Congress would have to effect certain improvements
in order to better perform and discharge its constitutional
fiscal responsibilities o Corrective actions deemed necessary
for improving congressional performance included:
l e Members of Congress should have access to relevant
budget information, so that they can make rational judgments
on the spending levels of competing programs.
2, Congress should place greater emphasis on the budget
as a whole.
3« Congress should place greater emphasis on major programs
and policies instead of the details and items of expenditure.




65u. S. Congress, Senate, Organization of Congress
,
S, Rept. I*n4 Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 2nd
sess., 1966, p. 3.
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k. The General Accounting Office should be utilized to
a greater extent in evaluating budgetary requests.
5. The substantive committees should acknowledge and
assume greater responsibility for exercising fiscal control
uhen authorizing new or expanded programs
.
In effecting these needed improvements, the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 19^9 gives an enlarged
role to the General Accounting Office (GAO) in budget review
and requires GAO to provide a variety of budgetary and fiscal
information to Congress. The Act extends the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting system to Congress as a technique
for reviewing the budget. The President's budget is required
to include greater fiscal detail and extended forecasts on a
project or program basis. The Act repeals the dormant pro-
visions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19 ;, !-6, such
as the Legislative Budget. New procedures are instituted
which enable Congress to consider the executive budget as a
whole. The substantive committees are required to submit
cost estimates for five years, or the life of the project
whichever is shorter, for new programs and activities, and
s
if possible, convert all permanent authorizations to an annual
appropriations basis. Finally, the Act requires rollcall
votes on all bills increasing or decreasing the compensation




A review of the proposed Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1969 reveals the following specific changes in the
"budgetary process.
The General Accounting Office, the Bureau of the
Budget f and the Secretary of the Treasury are required to
develop and maintain a government-wide, standardized infor-
mation and data processing system for budgetary and fiscal
data, and to establish standard classifications of programs,
activities, receipts, and expenditures. Another requirement
levied on the General Accounting Office is the compilation of
current budget information, including changes in budget totals
resulting from appropriations actions, new legislation, changes
in revenue estimates, and new or supplemental appropriations
requests. This innovation suggests the Scorecard proposal
of an earlier day. Lastly, the General Accounting Office
is required to have available a staff of cost-effectiveness
experts who are on call by the congressional committees to
assist them in the analysis of studies furnished by the
executive departments and agencies, or in making independent
studies for Congress.
The President is required to transmit summaries of:
estimated expenditures for the next four years for all




continuing p: ;rams ; and, estimates as to the rate of future
expenditures of those balances carried over from previous
fiscal years* In addition, the President is required to
report to Congress on June 1, of each year, a supplemental
summary of the budget reflecting significant changes in
receipts and expenditures which have occurred since the
preparation and submission of the Federal budget the pre-
ceding January. Again, this requirement has the flavor of
the Score card idea. It serves the primary purpose of keeping
all members of Congress informed regarding the Federal
financial program as a. whole.
In an effort to correct the fragmented approach to
budget review and to compensate for the substantial autonomy
of appropriations subcommittees, S 844 attempts to accomplish
a review of the budget as a whole. The Appropriations
Committees in each House are required to hold hearings on
the budget within thirty days after its submission by the
President, During these hearings, the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors would testify as to the
considerations and assumptions upon which the Federal budget
is based. The Act further provides that these hearings may
be held before joint meetings of the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees, that the testimony of witnesses
will be in open hearings and that transcripts of testimony

123
and hearings will be made available to all members of Congress.
As recom: led by the Joint Committee on the Organi-
zation of Congress j the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1969 would make the following additional changes in the
Federal budget process. Committee reports on each appropri-
ations measure would contain: an analysis of the major
factors taken into consideration by the committee in reporting
and recommending appropriations; and, a statement of the
consideration given to cost-effectiveness studies or analyses
conducted by the Executive Branch or by other congressional
committees, including information as to where members of
Congress may obtain copies of such studies. Special require-
ments are levied on committee reports recommending supplemental
and/or deficiency appropriations. These reports would be
required to explain why the appropriations were not included
in the regular appropriations bill or why they could not wait
until the following fiscal year. Obviously, the primary
intent is to discourage the submission of supplemental and
deficiency appropriations requests.
A major change being proposed is the requirement
for open hearings in both the Senate and the House. Open
hearings are required unless specifically precluded for
reasons of national security, or ruled to be confidential
under law or regulation, etc. If open, hearings arc subject
to coverage by the various news media, including telecasting,
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broadcasting or both e
In its expansion of the utilization of the General
Accounting Office in the' budgetary process, the Act requires
the Comptroller General:
1. to furnish the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations and Government Operations copies of all GAO
reports, and to furnish all other congressional corral ttees
with copies of those reports dealing with matters under their
respective jurisdictions? and,
2 e to designate GAO representatives to explain and discuss
their reports with interested congressional committees, or
committee staffs, in order to assist in their consideration
of proposed legislation.
The Act specifically requires that all Federal departments
and agencies submit to the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees a statement of action taken in response to GAO
reports and recommendations. Such reports are required
coincident with the department or agency's first request for
appropriations submitted more than sixty days after the date
of the GAO report.
Lastly, under Title II, the Fiscal Control area,
controls are tightened over authorization of new programs and
activities. Specifically, the bill requires that all sub-





1. a projection, made by the committee, of costs to be
incurred in carrying out such legislation for the then current
fiscal year and each of the following five f. : : ' ps ;
2. an estimate of gain or loss in revenues for a one
year period with respect to measures affecting revenues ; and $
3c a comparison of such cost estimates with any made by
the Executive Branch.
The bill requires substantive committees to make every effort
to authorize new programs on, and transform existing continuing
programs to, an annual appropriations basis c 6 '
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1969 is,
indeed, a far-reaching proposal for congressional reform An
almost identical bill has passed the Senate each year since
the original report (S c Rept. l4l5) of the Joint Committee on
the Organization of Congress in 1966 S e 38*18 was passed in
the Senate in 19o7« In 1968, S. 355 was passed in the Senate
by a vote of 75 to 9. Both measures died in the House
Committee on Rules *
The stage for congressional reform is again set.
S. 8^4- has been favorably reported out, without amendment,
by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, The measure
is on the Senate calendar (Number 192), and awaits the call
of Senate leadership for floor consideration, As of mid-March,
67T.»g1n1 ativeReor^anization Act of 1969 (A BillK
Sc 8^!-, pp. 51-58.
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1970, staff personnel on the Committee on Government Operations
advise that the measure has not been scheduled as yet. The
consensus of opinion is that the Senate is waiting for some
sign of action in the House, Similar legislation is pending
in the House Rules Committee. Twenty separate bills, all
nearly identical to each other, and to S„ 8*14, have been
introduced in the House and referred to the Committee on Rules.
Rather than pass S , Qkk, and forward it to the House, which
has been unsympathetic to reform legislation in the past, the
new Senate strategy seems to be "let*s wait and see what the
House does,"
However, the optimism, that was originally present
in December, 1970, in discussing reform legislation with
congressional staff members, is noticeably waning. Remembering
the cordial interviews of last December and January, which
described strong advocacy for reform among Senate leaders,
the mid-March response to a request for a follow-up interview
came as a surprising, and disappointing, statement that
"nothing had changed," The professional staff members on
congressional committees must find the lack of legislative
progress difficult to explain to outsiders. Efforts expended
on reform legislation have not often been rewarded by quick
passage of the relevant bill. It is not too difficult to
explain a growing pessimism among the personnel involved.
After this lengthy discussion of Senate action (or
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inaction) on reform legislation, attention is now directed
to the House. Unlike the Senate, congressional reform is not
a "hot" subject in the House. Neither, however, would it
be correct to state that reform is a "dead" issue. At times,
there are indications of significant House interest in change.
Since none of the reform proposals have been brought to the
floor, there is no way to quantify this interest in precise
terms. However, an approach to quantification may be found
in an analysis of legislation recently introduced on the
subject of reform. The House Rules Committee reports that
no less than twenty bills on legislative reform have been
introduced in the 91st Congress. All are based on the findings
and recommendat ions of the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress (Monroney Committee), A tabulation of bills and
sponsors foilows
:
H.R. 2185 - Legislative Reorganization Act of 1969 (Each of
the following bills have this same title) -
Introduced by Mr. Hall (for himself and Mr.
Cleveland) on January 6, 1969» For all intents
and purposes, this measure is identical to
5. 8 l 'A, except that it includes Title V -
Regulation of Lobbying. Messrs . Hall and
Cleveland served on the Joint Committee
(Monroney Committee).
H.R. 2186 - Introduced by Mr. Smith of California, on January
6, 1969* Similar to H.R, 2185 and S. 8*j4.
H.R. 2187 - Introduced by Mr. Smith of California, on January
6, 1969. Identical to H.R. 21 86 except that it
omits Title V - Regulation of Lobbying.
H.R, 2713 - Introduced by Mr. Re id of New York, on January
9, 1969» No significant changes included,
H.R. 6278 - Introduced by Mr. Rumsfeld (for Himself, Mr.
Cleveland, Mr. Schwengel, Mr. Anderson of Illinois,
Mr. Taft, Mr. Fiester, Mr. Brock, Mr. Bush,
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Mr. Conable, Mr. Coughlin, Mr. Dellenback, Mr.
Erlenborn, Mr. Grover, Mr. Harvey, Mr, McClory,
Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Michel, Mr. Morse, Mr. Morton,
Mr. Quie, Mr. Railsback, Mr. Ruppe, Mr. Steiger
of Wisconsin, Mr. Whalen, and Mr, Wydler) on
February 5t 1969. This measure includes the
Title V - Regulation of Lobbying.
Due to their being exactly identical, the
following bills, introduced under title of
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1969* were
not separately printed: H.R, 7371? H.R. 737?-;
H.R. 789^; H.R. 8973; H.R. 9331; H.R, 9791;
H.R. 10597; and, H.R. 11103.
H.R. 8158- Introduced by Mr. Eshleman (for himself, Mr.
Saylor and Mr. Fulton of Pennsylvania) on March
4, 1969. Includes Title V - Regulation of
Lobbying,
H.R. 10^26-Introduced by Mr. Rees (for himself, Mr. Jacobs,
Mr. Adams, Mr. Hathaway, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Gibbons,
Mr. St. Onge, Mr. Howard, Mr, Eilberg, Mr. Ottinger,
Mr. Leggett, Mr. Diggs, Mr. Scheuger, Mr. Rosenthal,
Mr. Boland, Mr. Brown of California, and Mr. Mikva)
on April 22, 1969. Includes Title V - Regulation
of Lobbying.
Due to their being identical, the following bills,
introduced under title of Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1969» were not separately printed: H.R. 10^27
and H.R. 11763.
H.R. 11^75-Introduced by Mr. Cleveland (for himself, Mr. Rees,
Mr. Adams, Mr. Anderson of Illinois, Mr. Blester,
Mr. Brademas , Mr. Brock, Mr. Conable, Mr. Fraser,
Mr, Gibbons, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Hathaway, Mr. Howard,
Mr. Hungate, Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Lowenstein, Mr.
MacGregor, Mr. Morton, Mr. Moss, Mr. Reuss, Mr.
Rumsfeld, Mr. Schwengel, Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin,
Mr. Taft, and Mr. Bob Wilson) on May 20, 1969.
Includes Title V - Regulation of Lobbying.
Due to their being identical, the following bills,
introduced under title of Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1969» were not separately printed: H.R. 11685
and H.R. 12586.
All bills were referred to the House Committee on
Rules, The Committee on Rules assigned jurisdiction to its
Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization, which was specifically
formed for this purpose. The Subcommittee, chaired by
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Congressman Sisk, subsequently decided that only three of
the bills differed sufficiently in content to warrant separate
attention, and thus, H.R. 2185, H.R. 21 86 and H.R. 11^75
were selected. All of these bills are nearly identical.
The major differences involve Title V - Regulation of Lobbying.
Some of these bills dropped this Title before being introduced,
All of the bills have their genesis in the hearings and report
of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress.
An item-by-item review of each of these measures revealed no
significant deviation from S, 84^, as passed in the Senate.
The provisions of the several bills, under Title II « Fiscal
Controls, are nearly identical, with only minor differences
in wording and space arrangement.
The Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization held
hearings on October 23, 30; November 6, 13» 20; and, December
3, ^i and 5s 1969. Thirty-six members of Congress appeared
and testified in person. Forty-four members of Congress,
including one Senator, submitted statements and letters.
There were fifteen witnesses other than members of Congress,
including representatives from the various news media, Bureau
of the Budgets, Library of Congress and the Capital Guide




Miss Jonna L. Cullen, Staff Member for the Subcommittee,
^Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, pp. III-V.
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made available a copy of the printed hearings and provided a
desk copy of a Committee Print, dated November 5, 1969. In
providing the Committee Print, Miss Cullen pointedly warned
that numerous and s:< leant changes had been made in the
bill by the Subcommittee. ^9 ^s f mid-March, the Subcommittee
had not reported to the full Rules Committee. After the
Subcommittee reports its findings and recommendations, the
full Committee may decide to reopen the issue and hold additional
hearings. Staff members opted not to estimate when the report
might be forthcoming. One staff member suggested strongly that
a report would be submitted to the full Committee, but chose
not to predict the future actions of the parent Rules Committee.
There is a strong temptation to terminate discussion
at this point and cite the lack of additional factual infor-
mation regarding House or Rules Committee action. However,
stronger, innate curiosity demands at least a cursory review
of the draft Committee Print, The Print should provide some
insight into the Subcommittee's position on the legislation
as of November 5» 1969. The review is, necessarily , limited
to those budgetary reforms under Title II - Fiscal Controls.
Title I provides for changes in committee procedures
and has been called the "Committee Members 1 Bill of Rights."
"9fliss Jonna L. Cullen, Staff Member on Subcommittee
on Reorganization of the Committee on Rules, House of Repre-
sentatives and Mrs. Forest, Staff Member, Committee on Rules,




Title I is generally regarded, as the most controversial p:
of the bill. Some witnesses testified that the reform pro-
visions did not go far enough in correcting deficiencies.
Other witnesses voiced equally strong objections that the
reforms were too drastic and really unnecessary. The
Appropriations Committees in both bodies are excluded from
most of the changes in committee procedure. This exclusion
may be deleted before the bill is reported out, however. Many
of the witnesses complained of the special privileges afforded
the Committees on Appropriations , Rules and Government
Operations.
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget* in cooperation with the Comptroller
General of the United States, are chs,rged with developing
and maintaining a standardized information and electronic data
processing system for budgetary and fiscal data. This particular
language serves to remove the direct responsibility of the
General Accounting Office, in comparison to the Senate bill
(S. 8^*4-). The information system requires standard classifi-
cations of programs, activities, receipts, and expenditures.
Treasury and BOB are required to submit annual progress reports
on the development of the information system to the Congress
annually in September. In addition, Treasury and BOB must
advise Congress on the location and nature of data available




The General Accounting Office is charged with reviewing
and analyzing results of programs and activities, making cost-
benefit studies and maintaining a staff of experts at
analyzing and conducting cost-benefit studies relating to
government programs «,
In order to make them fiscally responsible, certain
controls are established for the substantiating committees
when authorizing new programs e Legislation which creates or
expands any function, activity or authority must include:
an estimate of cost .for the first year; and, an estimate of
cost for each of the following four fiscal years.
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget must submit on or before June 1, of
each year, a supplemental summary of the budget reflecting:
all significant alterations in or reappraisals of estimates
of revenues or expenditures; all significant obligations
incurred against the budget since its original submission;
and, any other information necessary to provide a complete and
current budget summary.
The President is required to submit, also on or before
June 1, summaries of: estimated expenditures for the following
four fiscal years which will be required for continuing pro-
grams with legal commitments; and, estimated expenditures in




The Committees on Appropriations are required to
hold hearings on the budget as a whole within thirty days
after submission by the President. The hearings are required
to considers the basic recommendations and budgetary policies
of the President; and, the fiscal
,
financial, and economic
assumptions used in arriving at the total estimated revenues
and expenditures. Testimony would be received from the
Troika ~ the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, .The hearings would bo held in open session,
except when expressly waived for reasons of national security.
The bill provides that such hearings may be held before joint
sessions of the Committees on Appropriations from the Senate
and House,
Cost estimates must accompany all legislation.
Substantive committees are required to submit cost estimates
for the first year in carrying out proposed projects and cost
estimates for each of the following five fiscal years. In
the case of revenue legislation, committee reports must
contain estimates of the gains or losses in revenues for a
one year period. Substantive committees are further required
to report a comparison of the costs, as determined by the
committee, with the costs estimated by the Executive agency.
Finally, if these cost estimates and comparisons are not made,
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the committee report must include a statement explaining the
reasons for non-compliance. If bills are reported out with-
out these cost est:' n s and comparisons, the legislation is
subject to a point of order.
Finally, and most importantly, Title II, Part 6 ? of
the Committee Print, provides that the fiscal year be changed
to coincide with the calendar year,''70
The foregoing summary pertains to the titles
,
articles and sections in the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970, as of November 5» 1969 » the date of the Committee
Print, Miss Cullen, staff member of the Subcommittee, has
warned that many changes have been made in the bill since
November,, These changes, unfortunately, are not available
for public discussion and appraisal. Some indication of the
reception which the measure will receive on the House floor,
assuming that a reform bill of some kind eventually reaches
that plateau, can be hypothesized from the testimony of
congressional witnesses before the Subcommittee,
Congressman H, Allen Smith (R, California), a member
of the Legislative Reorganization Subcommittee, explaining the
limited scope of Title I, stated that:
99 per cent of the committee chairmen and everybody on
the Appropriations Committee would be against the more
70 u. S, Congress, House, Legislativ e Reorganization
Act of 1970 ( A Bill) , Committee on Rules, Committee Print No,
1, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, PP. ^8-72.
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extreme changes being recommended by some witnesses .
'
1
Congressman Charles W, Whalen, Jr* (R, Ohio) spoke
in favor of changing the fiscal year to the calendar year.
The Congressman stated a preference to have the President's
budget continue to be submitted in January. He recognized
that the executive departments and agencies would then have




Congressman Odin Langen (R, Minnesota) testified
in favor of changing the fiscal year to a calendar year basis.
He argued that a deadline of July 1, should be established
for completion of all authorization legislation. If not
completed by that date, appropriations bills could precede
authorizations to the floor. Representative Langen is a
top-ranking member (minority) on the Appropriations Committee,
Therefore, his position on the fiscal year change could be
s i gni f i cant „ '
3
Congressman Richard L. Ottinger (D, New York) was
in favor of the proposed fiscal year change. He blamed the
Administration and the authorizing committees jointly for
the lengthy delays in the appropriations process. Congressman
Ottinger expressed concern over the numerous exceptions
provided for the Appropriations Committee in the draft bill.
^
*
l Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 » P. 263
7 2 Ibid., p. 193. 73ibid., p. 289.
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He noted that exceptions related to open hearings, the seven
days filing time for committee reports, and the availability
of committee reports and printed hearings prior to floor
debate 6 Appropriations measures now require three calendar
days, including weekends and holidays, prior to floor debate.
Other legislation requires three legislative days. The
Congressman stated that he would prefer at least a week for
study and analysis of appropriations bills. As an example
of this short filing, he cited the Military Construction Bill,
which allegedly was available only two hours before floor
debate . 7h<
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D„ Indiana) testified
in favor of the fiscal year change; but, did not approve of
the several exceptions to standard provisions being afforded
to the Appropriations and Rules Committees in the draft bill .75
Congressman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (R. Michigan)
favored the fiscal year change and stated tha.t he and Congress-
man Robert H. Michel (R. Illinois), both on the Appropriations
Committee, had jointly sponsored legislation to change the
fiscal year to coincide with the calendar year.'"
Congressman Sam M. Gibbons (D. Florida) favored a
change in the fiscal year dates and advocated that a deadline
for authorizations be established at the end of September.
7^Ibid.




Thereafter, it would be in order for appropriations bills to
precede authorization measures to the floor. ??
Congressman Louis C. Wyman (R. New Hampshire)
commented on his proposal (House Resolution 557) to change
House Rule XXI and provide that when authorizing committees
had not reported out by June 1 , then appropriations measures
could be brought to the floor without being subject to a point
of order. House Rule XXI, Paragraph 2, states that "no
appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation
bill or be in order as an amendment thereto for any expenditure
not previously authorized by law." Congressman Wyman stated
that he believed five monthe was ample time for the substantive
committees to work their will. If the rules were changed to
establish a June 1 deadline, Congressman Wyman suggested that
78
a change in fiscal year dates would be unnecessary,'
There was no testimony, whatsoever, in the public
hearings against the proposal to change the fiscal year. How-
ever, during the hearings, there were some interesting
references to opinions held by influential members of the
House. For example, Subcommittee Chairman B. F. Sisk (D.
California) responded as follows to a witness testifying in
favor of the fiscal year change:
I might say I think our committee is pretty well
dedicated to this ideal. On the other hand, we have
had some objections expressed , by, let's say substantial
77ibid., p. 3^6. 7 8 Ibid., pp. 306-307.
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members of the Appropriations Committee, and so T
recognize, of course, there are differences of opinion. 79
Another reference to this difference of opinion came
from Congressman John Young (D. Texas), a member of the Sub-
committee on Reorganization. Congressman Young commented:
One of our distinguished colleagues who is affected
a great deal by this (the fiscal year change) does not
seem to think too much of it - the Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee. 80
Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee did not testify before the Subcommittee in a public
session,. Chairman Mahon appeared before the Subcommittee in
an executive (closed.) session, and, therefore, a record of
his current position on these various reform proposals is not
available. Mr. Paul Wilson, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
for the House Appropriations Committee, advised that he did
not know the extent of Chairman Mahon* s testimony, but
believed that it primarily related to the fiscal year change,
Mr. Wilson stated that while the recent executive session
testimony was not releaseable, Chairman Mahon had testified
at some length before the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress in 1965. Mr. Wilson stated his belief that the
Chairman's views had remained basically the same as far as
he knew. 81
Therefore, Congressman Mahon' s testimony before the
79rbid.
,




earlier Co/ < ittee will be briefed as the final part of this
Chapter
o
Before leaving this analysis and review of the
hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization,
the testimony by Philip S. Hughes, Deputy Director of the
Bureau of the Budget is worth noting. In brief, Mr. Hughes
testified that he favored the change in the fiscal year and
that he represented the position of the Administration,,
However, he proceeded to explain that in the last six years,
only six appropriations measures had become law by the start
of the fiscal year, -July 1. During this period, seven
appropriations measures had taken six months or longer after
the start of the fiscal year. Mr. Hughes recognized that a
major cause of the delay occurred in the authorizing process.
He commented on the many authorizations which expire every
year and require new legislation. In conjunction with any
fiscal year change, a recommendation vras made that the
President's budget by submitted during the first ten days of
April, in order to allow the Bureau of the Budget to put
together the data required. Mr. Hughes reminded the Sub-
committee, that while he favored the fiscal year change, it
should not be regarded as a panacea and would not be a




^Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, pp. 2-8.

1^0
As a final observation on the proposed Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970, a statement by Congressman
James G, s Kara (D. Michigan) reveals that not everyone was
over-awed by the contents of this reform bill
:
Let me say I am one of those who feels that there are
a. number of practices, customs and procedures in the
House of Representatives that could very well stand
reform and modernization, I am going to have to begin
by confessing that I think the bill that I have seen,
with phenomenal inaccuracy, misses most of them, ^3
But perhaps a more fitting finale would be reference
to Congressman Richard Boiling's (D. Missouri) remark on the
nature of the hearings and the type of bill that the Sub-
committee hoped to get reported out. He said that in his
view "reorganization involved housekeeping and reform involved
the power structure," He made it clear that the objective
of the Subcommittee was the former, rather than the latter, ^
This Chapter has identified the various legislative
proposals before the 91st Congress on the subject of congres-
sional reform* A statement expressing the position of the
powerful Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on
these various cha.nges would have been most helpful. However,
Chairman Kahon testified in executive session before the
Subcommittee, In order to gain some insight into Chairman
Mahon's views on the subject of congressional reform, a review
of his testimony before the Monroney Committee, on August
1?» 19o5» will have to suffice. The following observations
83lbid, t p. 37^. ^Ibid., p. 379.
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on budgetary and congressional reform are attributed to
Chairman Mahon and have been taken from the printed hearings,
Circa 1965,
Chairman Mahon' s opening remarks to the Joint
( Monroney ) Commi tte e
:
Government, as you know, is not an exact science c It
is not a matter of mathematical calculation* Government
is an art, and I think we need to approach our deliberations
with that in mind,
I doubt that we should do much tinkering with the form
of the legislative bcdy„ It seems likely that the greatest
need is to tone up the muscles. Toning up the muscles
calls for discipline and restraint • • • a type of remedy
or medicine which nobody in or out of public life seems to
like to take .85
Chairman Mahon continued by assuring the Committee
that Congress had not lost control of the purse, and he
suggested that those critics who claimed otherwise, either
were careless with their words or they were fiscally illiterate.
On the subject of increased professional staff for
congressional committees , Chairman Mahon anticipated that the
Appropriations Committee would have moderate staff increases,
but he reflected his basic conservative orientation when he
added that Congress does not need a great big staffs He
reiterated that real large staffs would not solve any problems.
The basic problem, Chairman Mahon believed, was the lack of
resoluteness on the part of Congress. The absence of this
congressional will to do its job could not be replaced by
85u. S. Congress, House, Joint Committee on the
Organization of the Congress, Hearings , Pursuant to S. Con.
Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st sess., I96~5, Heart II, pp. 1628-1629,
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delegation to staff personnel. He then quoted Disraeli,
"Are we to have a government of statesmen, or clerks?" Again,
he emphasized that in the final analysis the individual
congressman must study the issues and decide. Ke cannot
delegate this responsibility.
The Chairman voiced complete satisfaction with the
investigative staff of his Committee. He explained the
temporary nature of the assistance from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in directing the Committee's Investigative
Staff. Chairman Mahon further explained that his Committee
pulled investigators from various agencies , including the
General Accounting Office, and reimbursed their parent
organizations for their services,, When the task was completed,
temporarily assigned investigators returned to their respective
agencies and departments.
Chairman Mahon expressed little enthusiasm for the
Joint Committee on the Budget. He charged that every key
provision of the concept was unsound, unworkable or unnecessary.
He reasoned that members of Congress do not have enough time
as it is in order to accomplish all of their work, and thus,
do not need another committee assignment. Also, as a super-
committee, the Joint Committee would be just another layer
through which the budget must be processed, i^ithout adding to
the efficiency of the process. As an aside, Chairman Nahon
noted the lack of attendance by members of the Joint Committee
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during his testimony. Only half of the members were present
at the time.
The Chairman expressed approval of the requirement
for five year cost projections in the budget. Then noted that
the Congress had required such five year cost projections
since 1956. He felt the requirement was largely ignored due
to the fact that substantive committees found the total costs
of programs to be embarrassing.
Turning to the Executive Branch, Chairman Mahon
observed that many advantages had accrued to the President in
the budgetary process since the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921* He continued by noting the abortive
effort to provide some of these' advantages to Congress, in
19*1-6, specifically a method of reviewing the budget as a
whole, i.e., the Legislative Budget, He concluded by stating
that the Legjslative Budget should either be repealed or
implemented by Congress.
The authorization delays in the appropriations
process received his attention and he cited several examples
of such delays. He concurred with the idea of updating the
budget at mid-session.
Chairman Mahon cited "back door" financing as a
major impediment to congressional control over executive




I think that one ought to bo able to sit at the door
of the Appro- ions Committees and count the bills when
they come out each year and total them up and say,
"Congress has provided for this amount," But, if one
should do this, he would be disillusioned, because while
he sat at the front door, he would find at the back door,
without any processing through the Appropriations Committee,
vast sums, sometimes running into the billions, have been
authorized for expenditure in bills out of other committees . 86
In noting the popular interest in changing the
fiscal year to the calendar year, Chairman Mahon commented.
that the government used the calendar year until 1842. He
agreed that it was something that the Joint Committee should
look into and that, perhaps, the fiscal year should go back
to January 1 e
He complimented the Executive Branch, particularly
the President, for economizing in the use of Federal funds. He
suggested that the Executive was doing a much better job than
the Congress in this regard, "While the President was turning
off the lights to economize," Chairman Mahon testified,
"Congress was turning the lights on again and putting in
larger bulbs e " He cited several examples of the extreme
liberality and over-spending of the various substantive
committees and noted that the President had threatened to
impound some of the funds previously authorized as an economy
measure.






to the General Accounting Office, Chairman Mahon noted that
Congress had never appropriated funds to enable GAO to make
expenditure analyses of the executive departments as
authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19*!-6
•
Chairman Mahon said that he believed the law contemplated a
pre-appropriation budgetary review role for GAO, His comment
was as follows
:
About all I would say on it is that we probably should
take care not to involve the GAO in the business of making
detailed recommendations on pending budget requests « That
might get them tangled - and mangled - politically. There
are more profitable ways to exploit GAO facilities for
congressional purposes c It might be well to consider
repeal of the provisions °?
On the proposal to increase the use of electronic
data processing equipment, as an aid to Congress, Chairman
Mahon testified that he would be inclined to support any
"reasonable and practical use of EDP," He emphasized that
the feasibility of such use should be determined by impartial
experts in the field.
This concludes the review of Chairman Mahon 1 s
testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of
the Congress (the Monroney Committee) on August 17 and Zk,
1965. 88
This concludes, as well,' this Chapter on current
reform legislation relating to the congressional phase of the










The View From Congress
In a discussion of congressional reform, the view
from Congress should really be the view from the House of
Representatives* In the final analysis, it will be the House
that decides whether there is to be a Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970s or 1971, °r 1972 c This report has shown that
many reform measures have been passed by the Senate over the
past several years. The House, 'on the other hand, has not
been similarly inclined to embrace .reform*
Congressmen, and here the term is restricted to
its usual meaning as a title for members of the House,
recognize flaws in the budgetary system. Some of these flaws
are serious and require corrective action. Testimony before
the various committees on reorganization and quotations
elsewhere suggest that congressmen are hard pressed for time.
There is no doubt that their responsibilities are great and
there are many competing activities vying for their attention,
-*-n The Conp;ressman, His Work as He Sees It , a panel




be devoted to reform and the improvement of congressional
methods and procedures. The panelists argued that the
pressures of congressional responsibility were so great and
the activity involved with reform movements so time-consuming,
that only those items of direct and immediate concern could
be acted upon. The panelists admitted that defects in
congressional procedure, received their attention only when
some major crisis focused on especially grievious or gross
situations. The congressmen's collective appraisal of the
House was favorable, and they believed, on balance, that the
House was an effective institution The congressmen, participating
in the panel discussions, consistently mentioned the following
strengths of the House as an effective legislative body:
1, the careful scrutiny given to all legislative proposals;
2, the generally high calibre and expertise of the member-
ship and the salutary effects of specialization;
3c the so-called representativeness of the House, that is,
the close relationship which exists between the congressman
and his constituency; and,
4. the evolution of House structure and procedures which
have served to facilitate the effective operation of a large,
heterogeneous, and unwieldy body.°9
The House is acutely aware of unrest within its
89ciapp, The Congressman, pp. ^-5.
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membership and the criticism voiced by outsiders. Congressman
I .rence Coughlin (R. Pennsylvania) provided a thoughtful
summary of the present situation and the need for change in
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Legislative Reorgani-
zation. Congressman Coughlin testified as follows:
I am vitally interested in the ability of Congress to
reform itself . It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that many
of today's pressing problems - poverty, taxes, and
polution, to cite a few - will not be solved or
ameliorated unless the tools vie use are updated to
handle them. The last significant reform of Congress-
took place in 19^6. Since then, fast moving events
and developments have tended to diminish the effective-
ness of many tools at the disposal of Congress. In
order to preserve and augment the power and influence
of the Legislative Branch of government in the years
ahead, it seems to me that some of the ways that we go
about our business must be changed. I believe that
significant congressional reforms at this time will
convince many of the skeptics in this country that our
great system is fully capable of reforming itself
through the democratic process. 90
The consensus of opinion among staff personnel seems
to be that certain evolutionary procedural changes will take
place o Anyone expecting major changes in procedures or power
structure will be disappointed. Many of these staff people
have had long and intimate involvement in and knowledge of
the legislative process. As a group, the staff foresees
little change occurring in the power structure, i.e., the
seniority system and/or committee chairmen authority and
influence. In fact, these same staff people voice the opinion
that the traditional criticism which originates outside of
90Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, p. l6o.

Congress 3 s unfair and, in some cases, uninformed. In his
evaluation of the criticisms and the prospects for reform,
George Goodwin, Jr. writes as folic .
The realistic approach for a reformer, therefore,
seems to lie along the lines of improving the system
as it now opera.tes.9l
The urgency of congressional reform and the means
necessary to accomplish the required reforms are strongly




One way or another the massive job of congressional
reorganization and reform must get underway before it
is too late and. congressional government breaks down
und_er the strain" of modern pressures for action.
But, the truly fundamental reforms that are need_ed, those
affecting directly the power structure of the Congress,
can only be secured as a result of great pressures from
outside Congress. Reforms of this magnitude require
continuous, massive, popular insistance.
A majority of Congress is, in my view, prepared to
support reform, and very substantial reform, if popular
and Presidential demand is strong enough. The restoration
of congressional capacity to act, and thereby the restora-
tion of congressional prestige, is not only in the public
interest, but also in the interest of Congress as an
institution e 92
With all due respect to Senator Clark "substantial
reform of the pov.'er structure" is not likely to happen.
Though there was much testimony before the Subcommittee on
Reorganization to the effect that the changes proposed in
9lGeorge Goodwin, Jr., "The Seniority System in
Congress," The American Political Science Review, VIII, (June,
1959) » PP» M2-436, reprinted in Congressional Reform -
Problems and Prospe cts , edited by Joseph Clark, (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1965), p. 206.
92j seph S. Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch,
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 19o^-) , pp. 210-2^6.
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Title I of the Act did "not go far enough," the facts of the
matter are that the possibility for substantial change is
nil. The "young Turks," as the more radical and outspoken
members of the House are referred, are not likely to be
served in the immediate future. Congress is called, some-
times facetiously, "the World's Greatest Deliberative Body e "
The house leadership, with a decided conservative bent,
presumably intends to keep it that way, and with specific
emphas is on "d el 3 berative ,
"
If one accepts Congressman Boiling's definition of
reorganization as meaning housekeeping, .then a reorganization
effort may be successful. But, if one chooses to think of
reorganization as reform of the power structure, then he
will be disappointed in the outcome. The power structure is
most likely to remain intact. The House leadership and the
committee chairmen are not about to vote to give any of their
power away. Conversely, the junior members, though rash and
outspoken, are not likely to try to take the power and,
thereby, incur the displeasure of the leadership. The folly
of the latter approach was manifestly demonstrated in mid-
February when junior House members attempted to dethrone the
Speaker. In that unhappy instance, the power structure arose
to crush the junior up-rising somewhat unmercifully. When




The Viev? from Outside
In a well-written and entertaining "book, Obstacle
Course on Capitol Hill, Robert Bendiner describes the
historical trials and tribulations encountered in getting
an Aid to Education bill through Congress. On the subject
of reform, Mr. Bendiner concludes:
In fact, the remedies, most of them automatically
suggested by the very ills they are intended to cure,
have been advanced repeatedly and discussed exhaustively.
They are the subject of dozens of books, scores of
doctoral theses, and thousands of newspaper editorials,
not to mention occasional speeches by mavericks in
Congress and even more occasional inquiries by special
committees, which it appoints to consider some of the
more tepid approaches to reform.
Since there is nothing constitutionally prescribed,
much less sacred, in the procedures of Congress, the
remedies would seem, superficially, to be ready at
hand . 93
Not all of the critics are demanding major reform
measures relating to the power structure, A more reasonable,
evolutionary approach is advocated by James A. Burnham. Mr.
Burnham speaks of effecting technical improvements in congres
sional procedures. He would improve the information base and
provide Congress with better tools for accomplishing its
job. Mr. Burnham writes
s
Not even the warmest admirer of Congress denies that
its operations might, with advantage, be technically
improved. Quite apart from theories about the proper
93Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill,




place of the legislature, a change would be an improve-
ment if through it Congress were enabled to do better-
whatever it might be that 3 b was in fact doing. For
example f nearly everyone will agree that any change
enabling Congress to know more about what it is doing
is an improvement.
If Congress is to continue to have even a minor voice
in matters of the public purse, it needs a clearer, more
systematic knowledge of expenditures than it now
possesses
.
In any case, such merely' technical reforms should be
carefully distinguished from proposed changes that would,
if carried out, affect not simply Congress* methods of
operating but its political essence, and in particular
its basic political relations to other branches in
government and to the electorate. 9^
Prospects for Reform
The Subcommittee on Legislative Reorganization of
the House Rules Committee has worked hard during the hearings
and the drafting of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970, As a result of these herculean efforts, a recommendation
will be forthcoming to the full Rules Committee. The bill,
when eventually reported out, will not contain any drastic
reforms. Title I, relating to committee structure and
procedures, will cause the greatest flurry of excitement,
but it too will have been modified considerably. No major
threat will be posed to the existing power structure. The
Rules Committee may decide to isolate Title I and report it
9^James A. Burnham, "The Case for Congress,"
Congress and the American Tradition, (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1959) , pp. 262-278, reprinted in Congressional
Reform-Problems and Prospects , edited by Joseph Clark,
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1965)» P. 37.
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separately under a "closed rule." That is, no a ments orj
the floor would be allowed. The House leadership would not
be rational to expose House Rules (and power structure) to
a frontal attack from the floor. If reported under an "open
rule," the bill would be vulnerable to amendments from the
floor, and this could be chaotic.
Title II will be reported out in a form relatively
free from controversy. Title II, Part 6, which provides for
the change in fiscal year dates, will probably be deleted
before the bill is reported out, This prediction is based
on the fact that the Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee objected to the proposal. The Chairman testified
before the Subcommittee in "closed" session, so there is no
way of knowing precisely the tone of his statements. However,
references by Chairman Sisk to "substantial members of the
House Appropriations Committee" and Congressman Young to "the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee" as having
objections to the fiscal year change are conclusive enough
to kill the proposal. The House Rules Committee is not likely
to report a bill containing fiscal controls objected to by
the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
The influence of the House Appropriations Committee
villi be obvious in other areas as well. Title II, no doubt,
will contain permissive language regarding the joint hearings
on the executive budget at the beginning of each session.

15^
In contrast to the Senate bill which provides for joint
hearings on the budget within thirty days, the House version
will more likely provide that such joint hearings may be
held. Then » the measure will leave the procedural details
to be worked out between the Appropriations Committees, but,
the joint hearings are not likely to come to fruition B This
apparent obstinence on the part of the House Appropriations
Committee, with regard to reform legislation, is predicated
on its constitutional responsibilities as perceived by committee
members t. The Committee firmly believes that substantive
committees habitually over-spend Federal funds and the Senate,
in their opinion, is even worse than the House. Accordingly,
Appropriations members feel that it .is their primary and
constitutional duty to protect the Treasury and to enforce
economy and efficiency in Federal spending. This quest for
economy becomes almost, if not in reality, a religious
vocation.
Richard Fenno offers the following rationale for
House objection to budgetary reform:
To the degree that House Committee members believe
that they now enjoy pre-eminence, they will oppose
changes in the appropriations process which they perceive
as increasing the relative influence of the Senate.
And they weigh every proposed budgetary reform in
exactly these terms. 95
95Rich:ird F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse -
Appropriations Politics in Congress"^ (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 196~o~), pp. 62TT-629.
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Title II, it is predicted, will contain specific
language establishing the House position concerning the
proper role for the General Accounting Office. Earlier, it
was shown that the Senate has long advocated an expended role
for GAO, extending into executive budget review. The House
and the Comptroller General have historically resisted
efforts to assign the GAO these additional pre-appropriations
duties , The House generally, and the House Appropriations
Committee specifically, have steadfastly maintained that GAO
could be put to better use elsewhere. Accordingly, the bill,
when reported out, will probably assign these additional
duties to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget, with the General Accounting Office
in a cooperating or advisory role.
The bill probably will contain a requirement for
life~of~pro ject or up to five year cost estimates in committee
reports and, no doubt, the impetus towards encouraging
maximum annual appropriations review will be continued.
Conclusion
The conclusion of a report of this type should be
the easiest part. In the present instance, such is not the
case. In essence, there is no conclusion. Neither the House
nor the Senate has yet worked its will on the matter of
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congressional reform. The Subcommittee on Legislative
Reorganization has not reported its findings and recommen-
dations to the full Rules Committee. After the Subcommittee
reports, the full Rules Committee may accept the recommen-
dations of the Subcommittee, or it may decide to hold further
hearings of its own. The full Committee may decide to rewrite
the bill without holding further hearings. In any event,
this report does not pretend to prescience concerning the
future actions of the Rules Committee or individual congressmen,,
An informed staff member granted the Legislative Reorganization
bill a fifty/fifty chance of being reported to the House
floor. This, in itself, would be a first and a victory for
the Subcommittee. Another staff member, evidencing long-
involvement and much hard work on the bill, stated „ "If the
bill does not go to the floor this session, everything in
this office will be burned." A threat delivered with a
smile, of course.
1970 is an election year for many congressmen.
Congressional reform has received much publicity. Both House
and Senate leaders have been subjected to a great deal of
criticism in the news media. The Wall Street Journal character-
ized the Speaker of the House as lacking vigor and described
the Majority Leader as being too gentle. °6 This was one of
9°Arlen J. Large, "Clogging the Federal Money
Machine," Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1969, p. 22.
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the softer slams at congressional leadership over the past
several months. As a result of this increasing criticism
and growing public awareness and interest, the leadership
will insist on a reform/reorganization bill of some description
during this pre-election session. The bill may very well be
emasculated beyond recognition by the time it reaches the
floor, but a Reorganization Act of 1970 will be enacted.
Recommendations for change which have as their
primary purpose technical improvements in congressional
procedures have much merit. Such improvements are urgently
needed and, no doubt., will be accepted and used by Congress.
However, before accepting proposals for drastically
streamlining and automating Congress, perhaps additional
examination is required of the constitutional purpose of
Congress. With the Executive and Judicial Branches of govern-
ment often advocating expansion in Federal programs and
activities, and with a growing liberalism in certain sectors
of society, perhaps an appropriate balance of power or check
rests with the Legislative Branch. Congress has often been
referred to as the last remaining stronghold of conservatism -
particularly, the House of Representatives. It would seem
judicious, therefore, that careful and deliberate thought
would be in order prior to subjecting this body to reforms or
changes which would counter the constitutional check and balance
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